

# When Racism and Sexism Benefit Black and Female Politicians: Politicians' Ideology Moderates Prejudice's Effect More Than Politicians' Demographic Background

Hui Bai

University of Minnesota, Twin Cities

Using large samples that are nationally diverse or nationally representative (total  $N = 44,836$ ), this article presents evidence that citizens' prejudice does not usually benefit or undermine politicians who are from a particular demographic group, as many past studies assumed; instead, citizens' prejudice is associated with support for conservative politicians and opposition to liberal politicians, regardless of politicians' demographic background. Study 1a and Study 1b show that, regardless of the race and gender of real politicians, racism and sexism *negatively* predict support for liberal politicians, and *positively* predict support for conservative politicians. This overall pattern is experimentally confirmed in Study 2 where participants evaluate a hypothetical politician. Using data collected between 1972 and 2016, Study 3 shows that, historically, the predictive effect of racism and sexism on support for politicians in general is moderated by politicians' perceived ideology. Study 4 addresses a limitation of Study 1–3, and Study 5 extends the results for prejudice to the religious domain (i.e., prejudice toward Muslims). Together, these studies suggest that the way prejudice is related to support for a politician is primarily moderated by the politician's political ideology, not the politician's demographic background. Thus, this article highlights the often-overlooked role of politicians' ideology, clarifying theories that explain how citizens' prejudice is translated into their political preferences.

*Keywords:* prejudice, racism, sexism, ideology, political psychology

In the social psychological study of prejudice, race and gender are two of the most common dimensions of prejudice that researchers have investigated (Fiske, 1998). The relationship between racial and sexual prejudice and political preferences has received considerable attention from researchers in the recent decade (e.g., Carlin & Winfrey, 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016), as political candidates that are racial minority or female (i.e., Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton) have been nominated by major parties as U.S. presidential candidates for the first time. As one may expect, these studies revealed that racism undermined support for Obama, and sexism undermined support for

Clinton<sup>1</sup> (Bock, Byrd-Craven, & Burkley, 2017; Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Payne et al., 2010; Tesler, 2016).

## The Demographic Theory of the Effects of Prejudice and Their Limitations

The classic and intuitive interpretations from this line of work are that racism and sexism among voters can hurt a politician that is a racial minority and/or female *because* of the politician's race and gender. According to these past theories, racism undermined support for Obama because people who score high on racism measures are naturally “prone to oppose the leadership of a president from a racial group whom they consider intellectually and socially inferior” (Tesler, 2013), and they see “Obama's status as a presidential nominee as a result of undeserved race-based preferences that benefited him earlier in his education or political career.” (Dwyer et al., 2009). Similarly, sexism undermined support for Clinton because people who score high on sexism or have a commitment to traditional gender roles find her action of seeking political leadership as something inconsistent with proper gender roles (e.g., Bock et al., 2017; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Miller & Borgida, 2019). Ultimately, according to past theories, it is the demographic backgrounds, such as the race and gender of the

---

The author thanks the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) for collecting and providing data. The author thanks scholars affiliated with the CSPP and Christopher Federico's lab, and audience in various conferences for providing feedback to presentations based on this research. The author also thanks Mr. Daniel Moshe and the Writing Support Center of University of Minnesota for writing support and proofreading. Finally, the author also thanks all other individuals who have helped this project in various other ways.

All data (except that of Study 4, because of Institutional Review Board (IRB) rules), analytic code, appendices, and tables can be found at <https://osf.io/v2rha>.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to  Hui Bai, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, 75 East River Road, Minneapolis, MN 55455. E-mail: [baixx062@umn.edu](mailto:baixx062@umn.edu)

---

<sup>1</sup> Clinton refers to Hillary Clinton throughout this article unless noted otherwise.

politicians, that determines the direction of the predictive effects of racism and sexism. However, an often-overlooked alternative explanation for these findings is that racism and sexism hurt politicians that are perceived to be liberal, a political orientation that characterizes both Obama and Clinton and is antithetical to the implications of political expression of racism and sexism beliefs. The current article presents evidence that supports this alternative perspective.

There is some evidence that has already cast doubt on the conventional interpretation that racial and gender prejudice hurts politicians that are Black and female because of their race and gender. For example, there is no consistent evidence that Whites are less likely to support Black candidates (e.g., see Moskowitz & Stroh, 1994<sup>2</sup>; Reeves, 1997; Terkildsen, 1993 for discussions and studies that Black candidates are undermined by their race; see Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990; Highton, 2004; Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, & Nitz, 1995; Voss & Lublin, 2001 for discussions and studies that Black candidates are *not* undermined by their race). Although not the focus of their studies, Chambers and colleagues (2013) documented that modern racism usually correlates with evaluation of a hypothetical conservative person positively, but evaluation of a hypothetical liberal person negatively, regardless if the person is described as Black or White. Furthermore, studies also show that racism negatively predicts support for Clinton, a White candidate (Tesler, 2016 p. 67) and sexism positively predicts support for Sarah Palin, a female candidate (Gervais & Hillard, 2011). These findings seem to be inconsistent with the demographic explanation of prejudice. To account for these findings, researchers explained that the negative effect of racism on Obama may have spilled over to Clinton because of their connections (Tesler, 2016 p. 88) and Palin benefited from sexism because she conducts herself in a fashion that is more congruent with traditional women than Clinton (Gervais & Hillard, 2011). These explanations, however, have to make additional assumptions, and as a result, the demographic theory does not seem to be very parsimonious when accommodating these findings.

### The Alternative Ideological Theory of the Effect of Prejudice

An alternative and more parsimonious explanation that can account for these findings (i.e., Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016) is that the effects of racism and sexism on support for politicians are *primarily* determined by politicians' ideology, not their race and gender. According to the ideological theory, prejudice such as racism and sexism can be understood as personal values and beliefs that describe, prescribe, and justify a social order where Whites and males (or any dominant or majority group) are dominant and advantaged in a society, a proposition that dovetails with many implications of conservative policies in the United States (see Jost & Hunyady, 2005 for related discussions). Hence, much like how people evaluate social groups (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014), people who score high on racism and sexism should have a political preference that is characterized as conservative, such as being supportive of conservative politicians, because conservative politicians are perceived to share the underlying values with them, and vice versa for liberal politicians. Consequently, ac-

ording to the ideological perspective, sexism is positively related to evaluation of Palin because Palin is a conservative, and racism is negatively related to evaluation of Clinton because Clinton is a liberal.

The ideological explanation is more parsimonious than the demographic explanation not only because it does not need the assumption about Palin's conduct and Clinton's connection with Obama, but also because it requires less moderators to determine the overall direction of different prejudice's effect. For example, when predicting whether racism and sexism have a positive or negative predictive effect on support for a politician, the ideological model requires only one moderator (i.e., the ideology of the politician) whereas the demographic model requires two (i.e., the race and gender of the politician), as shown in Figure 1. As the number of types of prejudice increases, the ideological model would still require only one moderator, but the demographic model would require as many moderators as the number of prejudice types there are.

What about a politician's demographic background such as race and gender? Although racism and sexism are constructs about race and gender, the core of racism and sexism reflects beliefs about how the social order should be arranged *based on* race and gender, not about who should deliver the promise of arranging the society in that way. Politicians' demographic background might serve as a means for cueing citizens about the ideological preferences of the politician (e.g., Chambers et al., 2013; Fulton & Gershon, 2018; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Jacobsmeier, 2015; Koch, 2000; Lerman & Sadin, 2016; Sigelman et al., 1995). Nonetheless, according to the ideological theory for the effects of prejudice, it is ultimately the perceived ideological orientation of the politicians—that politicians' race and gender may be a cue for—that determines how racial and sexual prejudice relate to support for the politicians. Consistent with this idea, past studies show that people's attitude toward social groups with varying demographic characteristics are in general determined by the groups' perceived ideology (Chambers et al., 2013), suggesting that when it comes to evaluating a target, people seem to consider the beliefs and values of a target more than the demographic background of the target.

### Effects of Prejudice on Expression of Political Preferences: Politically Ideological or Demographically Prejudicial?

Based on the above, though researchers in the past often assume that prejudice undermines or benefits a political candidate primarily based on the candidate's demographic background (e.g., Bock et al., 2017; Carlin & Winfrey, 2009; Dwyer et al., 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Payne et al., 2010; Tesler, 2016), these findings are open to the interpretation that prejudice may in fact undermine or benefit a candidate primarily based on the candidate's ideology.

<sup>2</sup> It is worthwhile to note that the candidate's race in their study did not have a total effect on support for a candidate, but the authors still argue that Black candidates are undermined by their race because race has an indirect effect on support for the candidate via perception of personality. Thus, the evidence itself seems to actually favor the idea that people would not withhold their support for a Black candidate just because of the candidate's race.




Figure 1. Conceptual models for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 illustrated in the case of racism and sexism.

Therefore, to answer the question about whether prejudice predicts support for politicians based on politicians' ideology or demographic background more, this article tests and compares two alternative hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Which is consistent with the current ideological theory, states that the predictive effects of demography-based prejudice, such as racism and sexism, on support of a political candidate is "politically ideological" such that they are positive for conservative politicians and negative for liberal politicians. In other words, the predictive effects of prejudice on support of a political candidate are moderated by the candidate's ideology. This hypothesized pattern, in the case of racism and sexism, is depicted on the left side of Figure 1.

**Hypothesis 2:** Which is consistent with past theories, states that the predictive effects of prejudice are "demographically prejudicial" such that racism is positively related to support for White candidates and negatively related to support for Black candidates, and sexism is positively related to support for male candidates and negatively related to support for female candidates. Similarly, one would also expect that a citizen who has prejudice against Muslims, for example, would evaluate a Muslim politician unfavorably, and so on. In other words, the predictive effects of prejudice on support for a political candidate are moderated by the politician's demographic background; see right side of Figure 1.

Therefore, when considering the effect of prejudice on support for politicians, Hypothesis 1 assumes that what a politician believes and symbolically represents matters more than who the politician is demographically, whereas the reverse is assumed by Hypothesis 2. It should be noted that these two hypotheses are not competing hypotheses, and the patterns described by them can both be true. For instance, Miller and Borgida (2019) provided two reasons that sexism may undermine support for Clinton, that is, her candidacy as a woman and as a supporter of gender egalitarian policies, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2 as well as Hypothesis 1, respectively. Nevertheless, the goal of this article is to test and compare these two hypotheses and to identify if one of the two potential moderators has a more *primary* moderating effect. Theoretically, doing this can help clarify exactly how citizens' prejudice may be translated into their political preferences, and what type of politicians that citizens' prejudice will benefit or undermine. Practically, this can help us understand exactly what types of societal consequences citizens' prejudice might lead to. For instance, does prejudice such as racism and sexism undermine candidates who are racial minorities and women, and as a result,

contribute to inequality in the opportunities faced by individual political candidates (in line with Hypothesis 2)? Or alternatively (or perhaps, additionally), do racism and sexism undermine candidates whose policies can advance social progress, and as a result, contribute to inequality in the society as a whole (in line with Hypothesis 1)? As the number of racial minorities and women entering the political arena rises (Geiger, Bialik, & Gramlich, 2019) and the diversity of members of our society grows (Cilluffo & Fry, 2019), it would be particularly important and timely to find answers to these questions.

### Current Studies

To test these hypotheses, six studies ( $N_{S1a} = 482$ ,  $N_{S1b} = 1,200$ ,  $N_{S2} = 939$ ,  $N_{S3} = 40,251$ ,  $N_{S4} = 963$ ,  $N_{S5} = 1,001$ ) were conducted using preexisting data from large collaborative surveys that were designed by different researchers and used for different purposes. All surveys were distributed to American participants. The sizes of the samples are similar or larger than past studies on related topics (e.g., Dwyer et al., 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Payne et al., 2010). Furthermore, sensitivity analyses show that the least sensitive analyses across studies can detect an effect the size of  $f^2 = .028$ , a small effect, according to Cohen (1988).<sup>3</sup> Therefore, assuming that the effect size is small, the sample sizes of all studies should be sufficient for the analyses. Hypothesis 1 is tested in all studies and Hypothesis 2 is tested in all studies except Study 3. Studies 1 through 4 focus on the role of racial and gender prejudice, and Study 5 attempts to generalize the findings by testing the role of prejudice against Muslims.

The demographic characteristics of the samples are described in detail in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of measures used in all studies and correlation tables for all variables used in all studies can be found in Appendix A (Tables A1 through A6). Across all studies, the highest correlation between any racism and any sexism measure is  $r = .44$  and the lowest is  $r = .15$  and, therefore, it is unlikely that these measures are measuring the same construct or

<sup>3</sup> In Study 1a and Study 1b, the least sensitive analysis is the one with the smallest number of observations, that is, the Fiorina model that has  $N = 347$ . The effect size for it is  $f^2 = .028$ , assuming a power of .80, a total number of two predictors. In Study 2, the least sensitive analysis is the one with the highest number of predictors (i.e., M1 with 19 predictors). The effect size is  $f^2 = .022$ , assuming a power of .80, a total of 19 predictors. The least sensitive analysis in Study 2 is more sensitive than all models from Study 3, Study 4 and Study 5 because Study 2 has more predictors and less observations. Given this, the least sensitive analysis across all studies can detect an effect the size of  $f^2 = .028$ .

**Table 1**  
*Demographic Characteristics of the Samples Across Studies*

Year	Study 1a		Study 1b		Study 2		Study 3										Study 4		Study 5					
	2016	2018	2016	2018	1972	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016	2018	2018	2018
% White	0.78	0.73	0.88	0.62	0.85	0.87	0.84	0.85	0.85	0.80	0.78	0.75	0.76	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.75	0.70	0.49	0.59	0.71	0.75	0.75	0.73
% Female	0.56	0.53	0.57	0.53	0.56	0.58	0.57	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.56	0.57	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.55	0.56	0.53	0.57	0.52	0.52	0.60	0.60	0.61
Mean age	50.3	48.1	45.60	46.10	43.30	45.60	44.54	45.40	45.40	44.40	43.80	45.00	45.20	45.76	46.30	47.54	47.20	47.27	47.40	49.40	49.60	38.9	37.4	—
% College	0.75	0.57	0.74	0.29	0.33	0.35	0.37	0.43	0.43	0.41	0.43	0.42	0.39	0.46	0.50	0.54	0.61	0.62	0.52	0.64	0.73	—	—	—
Income	17.22	16.85	8.59	2.87	2.96	2.96	2.86	2.93	2.86	2.89	2.86	2.83	2.88	2.93	2.87	2.86	2.82	2.90	2.68	2.77	2.92	5.77	5.93	5.93
Ideology	4.19	3.24	3.93	4.14	4.26	4.17	4.31	4.32	4.24	4.24	4.26	4.37	4.20	4.21	4.45	4.33	4.27	4.27	4.14	4.17	4.13	3.65	3.54	3.54
Party identification	3.83	3.73	3.61	3.81	3.62	3.61	3.53	3.46	3.78	3.78	3.63	3.82	3.60	3.71	3.92	3.67	3.73	3.87	3.30	3.52	3.86	0.52	0.52	3.59
Total N	482	1,200	2,248	939	2,304	2,248	1,614	1,418	2,257	2,176	2,040	1,980	2,485	1,785	1,714	1,807	1,212	2,322	5,914	4,270	963	1,001	963	1,001

*Note.* All variables in this table is computed based on untransformed variables. % White denotes the percentage of sample that identify as White. % Female denotes the percentage of sample that identify as female. % College denotes the percentage of sample that have received at least some college education. In Study 1a, total N only counts respondents who completed measures for racism, sexism as well as feeling thermometers for politicians are included. Income and ideology are measured with anchors that are different across studies. Study 4 only includes responses identified as “uncontaminated” using Prims, Sisso, and Bai (2018) method (see <https://itayisso.shinyapps.io/Bots/>). The % College cell is missing in Study 4 and Study 5 because the surveys did not measure education. Party identification in Study 4 is not measured directly as in other studies. Instead a scale computed from subtracting the score for feeling thermometers to Republican Party and that of Democratic is used as a proxy for party identification (run from 0 to 1).

constructs that are entirely unrelated to each other. All study data (except that of Study 4, because of Institutional Review Board (IRB) rules), analytic code, appendixes, and tables can be found at <https://osf.io/v2rha>. All figures and results were created or analyzed using Stata 15.1, except all correlation tables described in Appendix A and the results from the pilot study for Study 2 described in Appendix B (that were created or analyzed using R). Across all studies, all variables other than indicator variables were transformed from original metrics to run from 0 to 1 where 1 represents a higher level of that variable in all analyses.

## Study 1a and Study 1b

To test the “politically ideological” hypothesis against the “demographically prejudicial” hypothesis, it is useful to compare how racism and sexism are related to support for Black politicians and female politicians against White politicians and male politicians that are liberal and conservative. It can be inferred that the relationships are primarily demographically prejudicial if racism is negatively related to support for Black politicians and sexism is negatively related to support for female politicians regardless of their ideology. In contrast, it can be inferred that the relationships are primarily politically ideological if they are negatively related to support for liberal politicians and positively related to support for conservative politicians, regardless of their race and gender.

## Method

Study 1a and Study 1b use nationally representative survey data from American National Election Study’s, 2016 Pretest Study and 2016 Pilot Study.<sup>4</sup> In these studies, support for politicians was measured using the feeling thermometer where participants rated politicians based on how warm or favorable they feel about them from 0 to 100 such that a higher score indicates a more positive feeling. The politicians that were evaluated by the respondents differ along the dimensions of gender, race, and ideology, and they are Barack Obama (a liberal Black man), Bernie Sanders (a liberal White man), Hillary Clinton (a liberal White women), Ben Carson (a conservative Black man), Donald Trump (a conservative White man), and Carly Fiorina (a conservative White woman).

Racism was measured by a scale that consists of respondents’ agreement with four statements such as “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve” (1 = *disagree strongly* to 5 = *agree strongly*). These statements, known as racial resentment, or modern racism, measure racism in terms of denial of historical difficulties faced by African American or characterize them as people who violate White American’s values, such as being hardworking (McConehahay, 1986). These statements were averaged to create the racism variable ( $\alpha = .84$  in Study 1a,  $\alpha = .86$  in Study 1b) in the main models. Although racial resentment is the measure of racism commonly used in past studies (e.g., Dwyer et al., 2009; Payne et al., 2010), it remains a debate whether it is a measure for racial prejudice or political ideology (e.g., see Carney & Enos, 2015; Feldman & Huddy, 2005; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; for critics, and see Tarman & Sears, 2005 for counterargument that it is a distinctive belief system

<sup>4</sup>The details about these datasets can be found in <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/anes-2016-recruitment-pretest-study/> and <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/anes-2016-pilot-study/>.

that is different from ideology). To address this concern, racism was alternatively measured with a “racial prejudice index” the author constructed. In Study 1a, this index consists of a reverse coded feeling thermometer for Blacks (0 = most unfavorable, 100 = most favorable), an item that measures participants’ beliefs that Blacks are unintelligent (1 = intelligent, 7 = unintelligent) and an item that measures participants’ beliefs that Blacks are lazy (1 = hardworking, 7 = lazy), weighted equally (i.e., rescaling each variable to run from 0 to 1 and then taking the average of them;  $\alpha = .66$ ). Though the feeling thermometer appears to have less to do with prejudice, this way of operationalizing prejudice has been used in the past studies as a measure of prejudice (e.g., Chambers et al., 2013). In Study 1b, the index consists of a reverse coded feeling thermometer for Blacks (anchored similarly as in Study 1a above), an item that measures participants’ beliefs that Blacks are lazy (“How well does the word ‘lazy’ describe most members of each group (Blacks)?” 1 = *extremely well*, 5 = *not at all well*; reverse coded) and an item that measures participants’ beliefs that Blacks are violent (“How well does the word ‘violent’ describe most members of each group? (Blacks)” 1 = *extremely well*, 5 = *not at all well*; reverse coded), weighted equally ( $\alpha = .78$ ).

Sexism was measured by respondents’ agreement with statements that downplay or trivialize gender inequality or deny women equal treatment. It was measured using the average of six statements in Study 1a ( $\alpha = .69$ ; e.g., “When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more problems than they solve?” 1 = *never*, 5 = *always*), and just one statement in Study 1b (i.e., “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose requiring employers to pay women and men the same amount for the same work?” 1 = *favor a great deal*, 7 = *oppose a great deal*).

**Results**

**Individual models.** Twelve regressions (six in Study 1a and six in Study 1b) were conducted using racism (measured using the racial resentment scale) and sexism variables to predict evaluations of each politician individually, and the results are summarized in Table 2. An alternative set of analyses using the “racial prejudice index” was conducted, and the results are summarized in Table 3. Across all analyses reported in Table 2, the coefficients for racism and sexism are significantly positive for the conservative politicians and negative for the liberal politicians, other than the coefficient for sexism on evaluation of Trump. The overall pattern is similar for the analyses reported in Table 3, albeit, in Study 1a, the term for racism in the Sanders model and Trump model is only marginally significant, and this term is not significant in the Carson model and the Fiorina model. However, all of these terms are significant in Study 1b. The terms that are not significant are primarily found in models that have a comparatively small number of observations in Study 1a (e.g., the Fiorina model), and Study 1a overall has a much smaller sample size than Study 1b. Therefore, the lack of significance is probably because of a lack of power, as opposed to a lack of effect. Based on the results from individual models, overall, respondents who score high on racism and sexism measures are more likely to view conservative politicians favorably, even if the politicians are Black (i.e., Carson) or female (i.e., Fiorina). In contrast, they are less likely to view liberal politicians favorably, even if they are White (i.e., B. Sanders and Clinton) or

**Table 2**  
*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Resentment Scale) and Sexism on Evaluation of Politicians With Varying Ideology and Demographic Background in Study 1a and Study 1b*

Models	Obama			Sanders			Clinton			Carson			Trump			Fiorina			
	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	
<b>Study 1a</b>																			
Racism	-0.52***	0.05	[-0.62, -0.41]	-0.34***	0.04	[-0.42, -0.25]	-0.27***	0.05	[-0.38, -0.17]	0.18***	0.05	[0.33, 0.54]	0.44***	0.05	[0.33, 0.54]	0.18***	0.05	[0.08, 0.28]	
Sexism	-0.30***	0.09	[-0.47, -0.13]	-0.35***	0.08	[-0.51, -0.2]	-0.42***	0.09	[-0.60, -0.24]	0.40***	0.08	[0.25, 0.56]	0.07	0.09	[-0.10, 0.23]	0.25**	0.09	[0.08, 0.41]	
Constant	1.00***	0.04	[0.93, 1.07]	0.89***	0.03	[0.82, 0.96]	0.83***	0.04	[0.75, 0.91]	0.18***	0.04	[0.11, 0.25]	0.19***	0.04	[0.11, 0.28]	0.21***	0.04	[0.14, 0.28]	
Observations	482			477			450			440			374			347			
R <sup>2</sup>	0.27			0.22			0.16			0.14			0.19			0.11			
<b>Study 1b</b>																			
Racism	-0.76***	0.03	[-0.82, -0.71]	-0.49***	0.03	[-0.55, -0.44]	-0.55***	0.03	[-0.61, -0.49]	0.44***	0.03	[0.39, .50]	0.65***	0.03	[0.59, 0.71]	0.37***	0.02	[0.32, 0.41]	
Sexism	-0.20***	0.03	[-0.26, -0.13]	-0.29***	0.03	[-0.35, -0.22]	-0.22***	0.04	[-0.29, -0.15]	0.16***	0.03	[0.10, 0.22]	0.06†	0.03	[-0.01, 0.13]	0.09**	0.03	[0.04, 0.15]	
Constant	0.97***	0.02	[0.93, 1.00]	0.84***	0.02	[0.81, 0.88]	0.79***	0.02	[0.75, 0.83]	0.14***	0.02	[0.10, 0.17]	-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.03]	0.14***	0.02	[0.11, 0.17]	
Observations	1,198			1,192			1,199			1,192			1,197			1,173			
R <sup>2</sup>	0.42			0.30			0.26			0.23			0.30			0.19			

Note. CI = confidence interval.  
†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 3  
*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Prejudice Index) and Sexism on Evaluation of Individual Politicians With Varying Ideology and Demographic Background in Study 1a and Study 1b*

Models	Obama			Sanders			Clinton			Carson			Trump			Fiorina		
	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI
<b>Study 1a</b>																		
Racism	-0.28***	0.08	[-0.45, -0.12]	-0.13†	0.07	[-0.27, 0.01]	-0.25**	0.08	[-0.41, -0.11]	-0.07	0.08	[-0.23, 0.08]	0.15†	0.09	[-0.02, 0.32]	-0.09	0.08	[-0.24, 0.07]
Sexism	-0.62***	0.09	[-0.79, -0.44]	-0.61***	0.08	[-0.76, -0.45]	-0.56***	0.09	[-0.73, -0.38]	0.55***	0.08	[0.40, 0.71]	0.32***	0.09	[0.14, 0.49]	0.42***	0.08	[0.26, 0.57]
Constant	0.99***	0.05	[0.90, 1.09]	0.88***	0.04	[0.80, 0.96]	0.85***	0.05	[0.76, 0.94]	0.25***	0.04	[0.16, 0.34]	0.28***	0.06	[0.17, 0.39]	0.27***	0.04	[0.18, 0.36]
Observations	467			461			436			424			360			336		
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.14			0.15			0.13			0.11			0.05			0.08		
<b>Study 1b</b>																		
Racism	-0.46***	-0.04	[-0.54, -0.38]	-0.34***	0.04	[-0.41, -0.27]	-0.34***	0.04	[-0.42, -0.26]	0.11**	0.04	[0.04, 0.18]	0.44***	0.04	[0.36, 0.52]	0.09**	0.03	[0.03, 0.15]
Sexism	-0.32***	-0.04	[-0.39, -0.24]	-0.35***	0.03	[-0.42, -0.28]	-0.31***	0.04	[-0.39, -0.23]	0.27***	0.03	[0.20, 0.33]	0.16***	0.04	[0.08, 0.23]	0.17***	0.03	[0.11, 0.23]
Constant	0.71***	-0.02	[0.67, -0.74]	0.69***	0.02	[0.66, 0.72]	0.60***	0.02	[0.57, 0.64]	0.34***	0.02	[0.31, 0.37]	0.20***	0.02	[0.17, 0.24]	0.31***	0.01	[0.28, 0.34]
Observations	1187			1183			1,188			1,181			1,186			1,163		
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.17			0.17			0.13			0.07			0.12			0.04		

Note. CI = confidence interval.

†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

male (i.e., Sanders and Obama). Therefore, these results support Hypothesis 1 but not Hypothesis 2.

**Mixed effect models.** Though the models described in Table 2 and Table 3 reveal the effect of racism and sexism on support for various politicians individually, they can only qualitatively test the effect of demographic background of politicians, a key empirical dimension discussed in Hypothesis 2. Therefore, mixed effect models were estimated to quantitatively compare the effect of politicians' ideology and demographic background. These models are summarized in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 summarize two pairs of models—the upper half is a pair consisting of an ideology model (to test Hypothesis 1) and a demographics model (to test Hypothesis 2) using data from Study 1a. The lower half has a corresponding pair using data from Study 1b. Both pairs use the racial resentment scale as the racism measure. Table 5 summarizes two parallel pairs of models using the “racial prejudice index” as the racism measure.

In these models, the evaluation of each of the politicians was treated as the repeated measure, so this variable is nested in the respondent. Three new variables were created to describe the politicians, and they are D\_Ideo (coded as 1 if a politician was affiliated with the conservative party, and -1 otherwise), D\_Race (coded as 1 if a politician was White, and -1 otherwise), and D\_Gender (coded as 1 if a politician was male, and -1 otherwise). In all models, variables for racism and sexism were used to predict evaluation of the politicians. For ideology models, a term for D\_Ideo, an interaction term for D\_Ideo  $\times$  Racism, and an interaction term for D\_Ideo  $\times$  Sexism were included as predictors to reflect the theoretical model described on the left side of Figure 1. For demographics models, a term for D\_Race, a term for D\_Gender, an interaction term for D\_Race  $\times$  Racism, and an interaction term for D\_Gender  $\times$  Sexism were included to reflect the theoretical model described on the right side of Figure 1. Random intercepts were estimated in these models to account for the interdependence of observations from the same participant. No random slope was included in these models.

Reviewing the mixed effect models, all interaction terms in the ideological models are significant, supporting the moderation effect of politicians' ideology. In the demographic models, the interaction term for D\_Race  $\times$  Racism is significant in three out of four cases (i.e., other than the one using racial prejudice index in Study 1a, described in the upper half of Table 5) providing some support for the moderation of politicians' race, but the term for D\_Gender  $\times$  Sexism is not significant in any model, providing no evidence for the moderation of politicians' gender. To quantitatively compare the models' support for Hypothesis 1 relative to Hypothesis 2, Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indices (also summarized in the tables) of ideology models were compared with demographics models. Throughout the models in Table 4 and Table 5, the AIC and BIC of the ideology model are smaller than that of the demographics model, providing more support for Hypothesis 1 than Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the predictive effect of racism and sexism are primarily determined by politicians' ideology, not primarily determined by their race or gender.

## Discussion

Overall, across the results from individual models and mixed effect models, evidence is more supportive of Hypothesis 1 than Hypothesis 2. The racism aspect of Hypothesis 2 still receives some support in the mixed effect models, as the term for D\_Race  $\times$  Racism is significant in several cases (though the term has a much smaller value than that

Table 4

*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Resentment Scale) and Sexism on Evaluation of Politicians Using Mixed Effect Models in Study 1a and Study 1b*

Models	Ideology model			Demographics model		
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI
<b>Study 1a</b>						
Racism	-0.05	0.03	[-0.10, 0]	-0.12***	0.03	[-0.17, -0.06]
Sexism	-0.06	0.04	[-0.14, 0.03]	-0.09	0.05	[-0.18, 0.01]
D_Ideo	-0.35***	0.02	[-0.38, -0.32]			
D_Race				-0.02	0.01	[-0.05, 0]
D_Gender				0.02	0.02	[-0.01, 0.06]
D_Ideo × Racism	0.32***	0.02	[0.28, 0.36]			
D_Ideo × Sexism	0.29***	0.03	[0.22, 0.35]			
D_Race × Racism				0.04*	0.02	[0.00, 0.08]
D_Gender × Sexism				0.02	0.04	[-0.05, 0.09]
Constant	0.55***	0.02	[0.51, 0.59]	0.61***	0.02	[0.57, 0.66]
Observations	2,570			2,570		
Number of groups	589			589		
AIC BIC	49.67 96.49			579.77 632.43		
<b>Study 1b</b>						
Racism	-0.06***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.03]	-0.08***	0.01	[-0.11, -0.05]
Sexism	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.09, -0.04]	-0.07***	0.02	[-0.10, -0.04]
D_Ideo	-0.39***	0.01	[-0.40, -0.37]			
D_Race				-0.05***	0.01	[-0.07, -0.03]
D_Gender				0.02**	0.01	[0.01, 0.03]
D_Ideo × Racism	0.55***	0.01	[0.52, 0.57]			
D_Ideo × Sexism	0.17***	0.01	[0.14, 0.2]			
D_Race × Racism				0.07***	0.01	[0.04, 0.1]
D_Gender × Sexism				0.02	0.02	[-0.01, 0.05]
Constant	0.48***	0.01	[0.46, 0.5]	0.49***	0.01	[0.47, 0.51]
Observations	7,151			7,151		
Number of groups	1,200			1,200		
AIC BIC	2517.62 2572.62			4939.31 5001.18		

*Note.* CI = confidence interval; AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

of the interaction terms in the ideology models). Therefore, it is possible that politicians' demographic background (in particular, race), though not a primary moderator, still plays a role. Nonetheless, it should be noted that if the politicians' race happens to covary with their (perceived) ideology, the significance of D\_Race × Racism could also be an artifact.<sup>5</sup> This limitation will be addressed using experiments in Study 2 and Study 4 that manipulate politicians' race and ideology independently.

## Study 2

There are some unanswered questions and limitations in Study 1a and Study 1b. First, the politicians used in Study 1 are well-known politicians that citizens already have knowledge about and, therefore, there can be potential confounding variables that explain how prejudice is related to support for the politicians (such as the above-mentioned issue that race and ideology may covary). Second, the ideologies of the politicians in Study 1a and Study 1b align with the actual ideology of the party that they are affiliated with. Therefore, it is unclear from Study 1 whether the moderating effect of politicians' ideology can be alternatively explained by politicians' party affiliation. Third, benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and separate sphere ideology (Miller & Borgida, 2016) are two types of sexism that are somewhat "subtle" in the subject matter. Whereas the former characterizes women with ostensibly positive yet restrictive stereotypes, the latter presume that men and women are innately different

and, therefore, it is justified that they occupy "different but equal" spheres of social life. Both are receiving growing attention from scholars who study sexism regarding its effect in the most recent election cycle (e.g., Miller & Borgida, 2019; Ratliff, Redford, Conway, & Smith, 2019). It is unclear whether these types of sexism relate to support for politicians in a similar fashion as the sexism measures used in Study 1. To address these issues, Study 2 relies on an experiment where participants evaluate a hypothetical political candidate whose ideology, party, race, and gender are manipulated independently, and it operationalizes sexism with the two types of sexism mentioned above.

## Method

The experiment in Study 2 was embedded in a larger collaborative online survey as part of the Center for the Study of Political Psychology, 2018 Election Study. The survey includes measures and modules proposed by different researchers for different purposes. The survey was distributed on Lucid, an online survey platform. Racism in the

<sup>5</sup> In particular, this may happen (i.e., the D\_Race × Racism term is significant as an artifact) if the average (perceived) ideology of Obama and Carson is more liberal than the average (perceived) ideology of Sanders, Clinton, Trump, and Fiorina. In this hypothetical case, the term's significance would reflect the moderating effect of (perceived) politicians' ideology, not a moderating effect of politicians' race.

Table 5

*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Prejudice Index) and Sexism on Evaluation of Politicians Using Mixed Effect Models in Study 1a and Study 1b*

Models	Ideological model			Demographic model		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
<b>Study 1a</b>						
Racism	-0.11**	0.04	[-0.19, -0.03]	-0.16***	0.04	[-0.24, -0.07]
Sexism	-0.07	0.04	[-0.15, 0.01]	-0.14**	0.05	[-0.23, -0.05]
D_Ideo	-0.32***	0.02	[-0.36, -0.29]			
D_Race				-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.02]
D_Gender				0.03	0.02	[-0.00, 0.07]
D_Ideo × Racism	0.12***	0.03	[0.06, 0.19]			
D_Ideo × Sexism	0.51***	0.03	[0.44, 0.57]			
D_Race × Racism				0.03	0.03	[-0.04, 0.1]
D_Gender × Sexism				0.00	0.04	[-0.07, 0.08]
Constant	0.59***	0.02	[0.54, 0.63]	0.64***	0.03	[0.59, 0.69]
Observations	2,484			2,484		
Number of groups	567			567		
AIC BIC	262.55 309.09			552.53 604.89		
<b>Study 1b</b>						
Racism	-0.08***	0.02	[-0.11, -0.05]	-0.11***	0.02	[-0.14, -0.07]
Sexism	-0.06***	0.01	[-0.09, -0.03]	-0.07***	0.02	[-0.10, -0.04]
D_Ideo	-0.19***	0.01	[-0.20, -0.18]			
D_Race				-0.03***	0.01	[-0.04, -0.01]
D_Gender				0.02**	0.01	[0.01, 0.03]
D_Ideo × Racism	0.30***	0.02	[0.27, 0.33]			
D_Ideo × Sexism	0.26***	0.01	[0.23, 0.29]			
D_Race × Racism				0.06***	0.02	[0.03, 0.1]
D_Gender × Sexism				0.02	0.02	[-0.01, 0.05]
Constant	0.47***	0.01	[0.46, 0.49]	0.48***	0.01	[0.46, 0.49]
Observations	7,088			7,088		
Number of groups	1,189			1,189		
AIC BIC	4057.69 4112.62			4917.57 4979.37		

Note. CI = confidence interval; AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion.

\*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

main models was measured using the same racial resentment scale used in Study 1. Similar to Study 1, this study also uses a "racial prejudice index" that was constructed by the author as an alternative measure for racism. This index consists of a reverse coded feeling thermometer for Blacks (anchored similarly as in Study 1a above), an item that measures participants' beliefs that Blacks are unintelligent, an item that measures participants' beliefs that Blacks are violent, and an item that measures participants' beliefs that Blacks are lazy (Under the instruction "Where would you rate African-Americans in general on these scales?" participants respond to 1 = *lazy*, 7 = *hardworking*; 1 = *unintelligent*, 7 = *intelligent*; 1 = *violent*, 7 = *nonviolent*; all reverse coded), weighted equally like in Study 1 ( $\alpha = .82$ ).

For sexism measures, participants responded to a scale of ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996;  $\alpha = .87$ ; e.g., "Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess" 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*) consists of 14 items selected from Glick and Fiske's (1996) original scale that were found by them to have the highest factor loadings.<sup>6</sup> Participants also responded to the 15-item separate sphere ideology or "SSI" (Miller & Borgida, 2016,  $\alpha = .86$ ; e.g., "There are certain care-giving jobs, like nursing, that just naturally fit with women's skills better than men's skills." 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*) as another sexism measure.

For the key dependent variable, each respondent was randomly assigned to review and evaluate a profile of a hypothetical political candidate. The candidate's race, gender, ideology, and party affiliation were experimentally manipulated using a 2 (Black vs. White) × 2 (male vs. female) × 2 (conservative vs. liberal) × 2 (Democrat vs. Republican) between-subjects design, fully crossed. Hence there were 16 unique

combinations of race, gender, ideology, and party in total. Between 53 and 57 participants were assigned to each condition. The manipulation was tested separately in a pilot study for its effectiveness, and participants were able to correctly recall all four manipulated aspects of background about the candidate.<sup>7</sup> Detailed descriptions of the pilot study and results can be found in Appendix B. Respondents evaluated the candidate by responding to two questions about how they feel about the candidate from 0 to 100 (100 = most favorable) and how likely they are to vote for that candidate from 0 to 100 (100 = 100% chance). The results for them were averaged as an index for politician evaluation, which reflects respondents' support for the candidate ( $\alpha = .84$ ).

## Results

Four indicator variables were created to represent each of the factors of the experimental conditions: "D\_Ideology" was coded as 1 if the participants were in conservative conditions, and 0 otherwise. "D\_Party" was coded as 1 if they were in Republican conditions, and 0 otherwise. "D\_Gender" was coded as 1 if they were in the male conditions, and 0 otherwise. "D\_Race" was coded as 1 if they were in

<sup>6</sup> Five items are from the hostile sexism subscale, and nine items are from the benevolent sexism subscale.

<sup>7</sup> Additionally, participants' recall of party identity was influenced by the ideological condition that they were assigned to, and vice versa for their recall of ideology (see Appendix B). However, the author could not think of any reasons that these spillovers can undermine the inferences related to the two hypotheses that this study focuses on.

the White conditions, and 0 otherwise. To test whether politicians' race, gender, ideology, and party affiliation determine the predictive effect of racism and sexism, the following analyses were conducted in the main models. In particular, variables for racism (measured with racial resentment scale), ambivalent sexism ("Sexism 1") and SSI ("Sexism 2"), and their interactions with each of the four indicator variables were entered as predictors for politician evaluation variable together (M1) as well as individually (M2-M5). A model without an interaction term was also estimated (M6) as a baseline model for comparison, which will be discussed in the general discussion. The results are summarized in Table 6. A parallel set of supplemental models was estimated using the racial prejudice index as the racism measure, and the results are summarized in Table 7. Figure 2a and Figure 2b describe the predictive effects of racism and sexism (i.e., SSI) by ideology condition using results from the two M1s in Table 6 and Table 7.

## Discussion

**Testing Hypothesis 1.** In these results, the significance of an interaction term implies that the corresponding characteristic of the politician moderates the relationship between the corresponding type of prejudice and candidate support. For example, the significance of the interaction between racism and ideology condition ( $D\_Ideology \times Racism$ ) throughout the models shown in Table 6 and Table 7 indicates that the relationship between racism and support for a politician is determined by the candidate's ideology, which supports the racism component of Hypothesis 1. Regarding sexism, results from both Table 6 and Table 7 fail to show that the ambivalent sexism measure is related to candidate support (even when the benevolent and hostile subscales were modeled separately).<sup>8</sup> However, there is evidence that the relationship between SSI and candidate support is moderated by politicians' ideology, supporting the sexism component of Hypothesis 1. In short, consistent with Hypothesis 1, respondents who score higher on racism and sexism measures tend to evaluate hypothetical conservative politicians favorably and hypothetical liberal politicians unfavorably.

**Testing Hypothesis 2 and comparing it with Hypothesis 1.** In contrast, inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficients for the politician's gender and race (and party affiliation) of the hypothetical politician throughout the models are not only smaller than the terms for ideology, but they are also not statistically significant. This reveals that these variables not only fail to play a *primary* moderating role, but they do not seem to moderate the direction of the relationship between racism and candidate support at all.<sup>9</sup> To formally test the observation that the demographic background of the politician does not moderate the effect of racism and sexism, the models that include all moderators (M1) were compared against the models that just include the ideology indicator (M2). The results show that the full models from both Table 6 and Table 7 are not a significantly improved model than the reduced model: for the models using the racial resentment scale as the racism measure (i.e., models described in Table 6),  $\chi^2(9) = 4.53, p = .87$ , and for the models using the racial prejudice index (i.e., models described in Table 7),  $\chi^2(9) = 6.74, p = .66$ . Therefore, inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, the results from the model comparisons is against the presence of *any* moderation effect of a politician's gender, race, or party affiliation of the hypothetical politician.

**Asymmetrical patterns for separate sphere ideology and the racial prejudice index.** Reviewing the patterns from Figure 2a and Figure 2b, they appear to suggest that separate sphere ideology and racial prejudice index both have an asymmetric

moderation effect on prejudice—whereas separate sphere ideology is only positively related to support for conservative politicians but not negatively related to support for liberal politicians, and the reverse is true for the racial prejudice index. These patterns, nonetheless, are most likely because of respondents' acquiescence bias. In particular, most SSI items response choices on the right side of the survey indicate *more* prejudice, but that of all items for the racial prejudice index indicates *less* prejudice. Since the choices for items about the candidate support variable on the right side of the survey indicate more support, participants' acquiescence may inflate the effect of SSI on support for conservative politicians and depress the effect on liberal politicians. Following this logic, the opposite is true for the racial prejudice index. Consistent with this, this issue was not observed in the racial resentment scale, which has exactly half of the items keyed in one direction and the other half in the opposite direction. This acquiescence bias explanation is supported with additional analyses in Appendix C (Figure C1 and Table C1) where the reversed pattern for SSI was found if only negatively keyed items for SSI were used. Therefore, correcting for the acquiescence bias, both SSI and the racial prejudice index should be positively related to support for conservative politicians *and* negatively related to support for liberal politicians.

In summary, the findings from Study 2 support Hypothesis 1, but they do not show any support for Hypothesis 2.<sup>10</sup> In particular, using the experimental method with hypothetical politicians, Study 2 isolates the effect of racism and sexism from potential unknown confounds that might have occurred in Study 1a and Study 1b. Furthermore, Study 2 shows that the ideological relationship between prejudice and candidate support is not alternatively ex-

<sup>8</sup> Additional analyses reestimated M2 where "Sexism1" is replaced with the benevolent sexism subscale ( $\alpha = .83$ ) or the hostile sexism subscale ( $\alpha = .87$ ) of the ambivalent sexism scale. Neither analysis found that the key interaction was significant: for  $D\_Ideology \times Benevolent\ Sexism, b = .06, p = .68$ , and for  $D\_Ideology \times Hostile\ Sexism, b = -.06, p = .65$ . This finding seems to be in contradiction with recent findings that ambivalent sexism (in particular, the hostile sexism subscale) predicts voting for Trump over Clinton (Ratliff et al., 2019). One explanation is that the effect of ambivalent sexism found by Ratliff et al. (2019) is driven by the variances that it shares with SSI, or the variances that SSI specifically addresses. To test this interpretation, an additional analysis reestimating M2 without SSI and racism and their corresponding interactions shows that the  $D\_Ideology \times Ambivalent\ Sexism$  term was significant ( $b = .67, p < .001$ ), but adding SSI and its corresponding interaction renders this term nonsignificant ( $b = .20, p = .29$ ). This study's discussion section will address why SSI may outperform ambivalent sexism.

<sup>9</sup> Though in Table 6,  $D\_Party \times Sexism1$  is marginally significant in M3, the direction is opposite to what one would expect.

<sup>10</sup> One possibility is that the moderating effect of a politician's ideology occurs only when the politician's ideology and party affiliation are "consistent" (i.e., conservatives are also Republicans and liberals are also Democrats). To test this, an additional analysis was conducted to include two higher order interaction terms, and they are " $Racism \times D\_Ideology \times D\_Party$ ," ( $b = .17, p = .28$ ) " $Sexism1 \times D\_Ideology \times D\_Party$ " ( $b = -.42, p = .18$ ) and " $Sexism2 \times D\_Ideology \times D\_Party$ " ( $b = .31, p = .35$ ). None are significant, suggesting that the moderating effect of a politician's ideology is not contingent on their party affiliation. Looking ahead, although the corresponding term in Study 3 (i.e.,  $Candidate\ Party \times Perceived\ Candidate's\ Conservatism \times Prejudice$ ) is significant in some cases (though in these cases, the sign is not always the same), the moderating effect of politician's ideology is still found among politicians from both parties and across the (perceived) ideological spectrum (see Appendix F). Therefore, the ideology-party consistency is not a prerequisite for the moderating effect of a politician's ideology.

Table 6  
*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Resentment Scale) and Sexism on Evaluation of Politicians in Study 2*

Models	M1. Moderator includes all			M2. D_Ideology as moderator			M3. D_Party as moderator			M4. D_Race as moderator			M5. D_Gender as moderator			M6. No moderator		
	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI
Racism	-0.60***	0.09	[-0.78, -0.41]	-0.58***	0.06	[-0.70, -0.47]	-0.15*	0.06	[-0.28, -0.02]	-0.09	0.06	[-0.21, 0.04]	-0.10	0.06	[-0.22, 0.03]	-0.11*	0.05	[-0.20, -0.02]
Sexism1	0.28	0.20	[-0.10, 0.67]	0.19	0.12	[-0.05, 0.43]	0.43**	0.13	[0.16, 0.69]	0.24†	0.13	[-0.02, 0.51]	0.23	0.14	[-0.05, 0.51]	0.27**	0.1	[0.08, 0.46]
Sexism2	-0.09	0.18	[-0.43, 0.26]	-0.02	0.11	[-0.24, 0.2]	0.07	0.12	[-0.17, 0.31]	0.11	0.13	[-0.15, 0.36]	0.15	0.13	[-0.10, .40]	0.14	0.09	[-0.04, 0.31]
D_Ideology × Racism	0.92***	0.08	[0.75, 1.09]	0.92***	0.08	[0.75, 1.09]												
D_Ideology × Sexism1	0.06	0.18	[-0.29, 0.42]	0.02	0.18	[-0.33, 0.37]												
D_Ideology × Sexism2	0.32†	0.16	[-0.01, 0.64]	0.35*	0.16	[0.03, 0.67]												
D_Party × Racism	0.11	0.09	[-0.06, 0.28]				0.08	0.09	[-0.10, 0.26]									
D_Party × Sexism1	-0.27	0.18	[-0.62, 0.09]				-0.33†	0.19	[-0.71, 0.06]									
D_Party × Sexism2	0.11	0.17	[-0.22, 0.43]				0.14	0.18	[-0.21, 0.50]									
D_Race × Racism	-0.03	0.09	[-0.20, 0.14]							-0.05	0.09	[-0.23, 0.14]						
D_Race × Sexism1	0.02	0.18	[-0.33, 0.37]							0.07	0.20	[-0.32, 0.45]						
D_Race × Sexism2	0.03	0.16	[-0.29, 0.35]							0.06	0.18	[-0.29, 0.41]						
D_Gender × Racism	-0.06	0.09	[-0.23, 0.11]										-0.03	0.09	[-0.21, 0.16]			
D_Gender × Sexism1	0.02	0.18	[-0.33, 0.37]										0.07	0.20	[-0.31, 0.46]			
D_Gender × Sexism2	0.03	0.16	[-0.29, 0.35]										-0.02	0.18	[-0.38, 0.33]			
D_Ideology	-0.66***	0.07	[-0.79, -0.53]	-0.65***	0.07	[-0.78, -0.52]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.07, 0.02]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.07, 0.02]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.07, 0.02]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.07, 0.02]
D_Party	-0.01	0.07	[-0.14, 0.13]	-0.03	0.02	[-0.07, 0.02]	0.03	0.07	[-0.12, 0.17]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]
D_Race	-0.05	0.07	[-0.18, 0.09]	-0.04†	0.02	[-0.08, 0.01]	-0.04†	0.02	[-0.09, <.01]	-0.07	0.07	[-0.22, 0.07]	-0.04	0.02	[-0.09, <.01]	-0.04	0.02	[-0.09, 0]
D_Gender	-0.01	0.07	[-0.15, 0.12]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]	-0.03	0.07†	[-0.17, 0.12]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]
Constant	0.83***	0.08	[0.68, 0.99]	0.84***	0.05	[0.73, 0.94]	0.46***	0.06	[0.36, 0.57]	0.50***	0.06	[0.39, 0.61]	0.49***	0.06	[0.38, 0.61]	0.49***	0.04	[0.40, 0.57]
Observations	748			748			748			748			748			748		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23			0.22			0.05			0.05			0.04			0.04		

Note. CI = confidence interval. Sexism1 refers to ambivalent sexism. Sexism2 refers to separeet sphere ideology. All "0" denotes values that are between -.01 and .01. † p < .10. \* p < .05. \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001.

Table 7  
*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Prejudice Index) and Sexism on Evaluation of Politicians in Study 2*

Models	M1. Moderator includes all			M2. D_Ideology as moderator			M3. D_Party as moderator			M4. D_Race as moderator			M5. D_Gender as moderator			M6. No moderator		
	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI
Racism	-0.39***	0.11	[-0.61, -0.16]	-0.47***	0.07	[-0.61, -0.33]	-0.29***	0.07	[-0.43, -0.14]	-0.20***	0.07	[-0.35, -0.06]	-0.18*	0.08	[-0.33, -0.03]	-0.23***	0.05	[-0.33, -0.13]
Sexism1	0.04	0.21	[-0.38, 0.45]	0.07	0.13	[-0.18, 0.33]	0.35*	0.13	[0.08, 0.61]	0.26†	0.14	[-0.01, 0.53]	0.17	0.14	[-0.12, 0.45]	0.24*	0.10	[0.05, 0.44]
Sexism2	-0.05	0.19	[-0.43, 0.32]	-0.06	0.12	[-0.28, 0.17]	0.16	0.12	[-0.09, 0.41]	0.10	0.13	[-0.15, 0.35]	0.21†	0.13	[-0.04, 0.46]	0.17†	0.09	[-0.01, 0.35]
D_Ideology × Racism	0.44***	0.10	[0.24, 0.64]	0.44***	0.10	[0.25, 0.64]												
D_Ideology × Sexism1	0.30	0.19	[-0.09, 0.68]	0.26	0.19	[-0.11, 0.64]												
D_Ideology × Sexism2	0.49**	0.18	[0.14, 0.84]	0.50**	0.17	[0.16, 0.84]												
D_Party × Racism	0.11	0.10	[-0.09, 0.31]				0.12	0.10	[-0.09, 0.32]									
D_Party × Sexism1	-0.11	0.20	[-0.49, 0.28]				-0.23	0.20	[-0.61, 0.16]									
D_Party × Sexism2	-0.03	0.18	[-0.38, 0.32]				0.05	0.18	[-0.31, 0.41]									
D_Race × Racism	-0.12	0.10	[-0.32, 0.08]							-0.06	0.10	[-0.26, 0.15]						
D_Race × Sexism1	-0.02	0.19	[-0.40, 0.35]							-0.02	0.20	[-0.41, 0.37]						
D_Race × Sexism2	0.14	0.17	[-0.21, 0.48]							0.13	0.18	[-0.22, 0.48]						
D_Gender × Racism	-0.15	0.10	[-0.35, 0.05]															
D_Gender × Sexism1	0.16	0.19	[-0.22, 0.54]															
D_Gender × Sexism2	-0.10	0.18	[-0.45, 0.25]															
D_Ideology	-0.51***	0.07	[-0.65, -0.36]	-0.50***	0.07	[-0.64, -0.35]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]	-0.10	0.10	[-0.30, 0.11]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.03]
D_Party	0.01	0.07	[-0.13, 0.16]	-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.04]	0.03	0.08	[-0.12, 0.18]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.05, 0.04]	0.14	0.20	[-0.25, 0.53]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.05, 0.04]
D_Race	-0.04	0.07	[-0.19, 0.11]	-0.04†	0.02	[-0.09, 0.01]	-0.04†	0.02	[-0.09, 0.01]	-0.06	0.08	[-0.21, 0.09]	-0.08	0.18	[-0.43, 0.27]	-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.04]
D_Gender	0.00	0.07	[-0.14, 0.15]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.07, 0.03]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.07, 0.03]	-0.04†	0.02	[-0.08, 0.01]	-0.04†	0.02	[-0.09, 0.01]
Constant	0.74***	0.08	[0.58, 0.91]	0.76***	0.06	[0.65, 0.88]	0.49***	0.06	[0.37, 0.61]	-0.02	0.06	[-0.07, 0.03]	-0.01	0.08	[-0.16, 0.14]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.07, 0.03]
Observations	715			715			715			715			715			715		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.14			0.14			0.07			0.07			0.07			0.07		

Note. CI = confidence interval. Sexism1 refers to ambivalent sexism. Sexism2 refers to separate sphere ideology. All "0" denotes values that are between -.01 and .01.  
 † p < .10. \* p < .05. \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001.




Figure 2. (a) Effect of racism (racial resentment) and sexism (separate sphere ideology) by ideology condition. (b) Effect of racism (racial prejudice index) and sexism (separate sphere ideology) by ideology condition. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

plained by the effects of partisan cues. Finally, the study shows that though ambivalent sexism is unrelated to candidate support, SSI is, and its effect is moderated by the politician's ideology. One explanation could be that whereas ambivalent sexism primarily focuses on the interpersonal differences and relationships *between* men and women, SSI addresses the roles of men and women *in the society* (Miller & Borgida, 2016), the latter of which is more amenable to actions of politicians.

### Study 3

So far, the studies suggest that the direction of the relationship between prejudice and candidate support is determined by a candidate's ideology. Based on the current theory, this is because prejudiced individuals wish to support conservative leaders because of conservative politicians' perceived intention to enact

policies that are consistent with the values that underpin their levels of racism and sexism. If so, the *perceived* ideology of politicians may play a key role in determining the relationship between prejudice and candidate support in general, regardless of the party the politicians are affiliated with or even how conservative the politicians actually are. With these considerations, Study 3 attempts to test Hypothesis 1 by using the perceived ideology of politicians as the moderator.

## Method

To test this hypothesis, Study 3 uses the American National Election Studies time series collected across 17 election cycles from 1972 to 2016.<sup>11</sup> Racism in the main analyses was measured using the racial resentment scale, and in alternative models it was measured using a reverse coded feeling thermometer for Blacks. Sexism was measured with a question about the degree to which respondents believe that women's place should be at home, as opposed to the public sphere. The item for sexism was asked with somewhat different wordings across time, but the response options are consistently anchored from 1 = *women and men should have an equal role*, 7 = *women's place is in the home*. The candidate support variable was measured using the feeling thermometer for the candidates, as in the other studies. The candidates evaluated by respondents include candidates for the U.S. president as well as the U.S. House of Representative. Their perceived ideologies were measured using one question that asked about how liberal or conservative respondents believed the corresponding politicians were (1 = *extremely liberal*, 7 = *extremely conservative*).

## Results

To test the hypothesis that the relationship between prejudice in terms of racism and sexism and support for candidates is determined by the perceived ideology of the candidates, racism and sexism and their interactions with the perceived ideology of candidates were used to predict support for the candidates, including indicator-coded survey years as covariates. These analyses are mixed-effect models. For analyses on presidential candidates, candidates' party (Democrat vs. Republican) is nested in the respondent, because each respondent rated their feelings for a Democratic candidate as well as a Republican candidate. Thus, random intercepts were estimated in these models to account for the interdependence of observations from the same participant. For analyses on house candidates, the candidates' party is also nested in participants, but additionally nested in congressional districts. Thus, random intercepts were estimated to account for the interdependence of observations from the same participant as well as the interdependence of observations from the same district. The analyses for how racism and sexism predict candidate support were conducted separately because in most survey years, the surveys only have one, but not both, of these measures. The availability of measures in each survey year is summarized in Appendix D (Table D1). Results are similar if models include both the interaction of perceived ideology by racism and the interaction of perceived ideology by sexism only using data from the years that include both measures (see Appendix E, Table E1).

The main results using the racial resentment scale as the racism measure are summarized in Table 8, the pattern of which is depicted in Figure 3a. The left two panes are for the effects of

racism and the right two panes are for the effects of sexism. The upper two panes are for the effects on presidential candidates and the lower two panes are for the effects on House of Representatives candidates. In the first two models (M1 and M2 in Table 8), only the moderating effect of the perceived ideology on *racism* is tested. In contrast, in the second two models (M3 and M4 in Table 8), only the moderating effect of the perceived ideology on *sexism* is tested. In the table, the term "Prejudice" refers to "racism" in the models that are under "Racism as Prejudice" (i.e., M1, M2), and it refers to "sexism" in the models that are under "Sexism as Prejudice" (i.e., M3, M4). Two parallel models similar to M1 and M2 were estimated using a reverse coded feeling thermometer as a measure of racism, and the results are summarized in Table 9. Its pattern is depicted in Figure 3b.

All models include a term that reflects the party affiliation of the candidates, and its interaction with the product of sexism/racism and the perceived ideology of candidates. Thus, the two-way interaction terms in the models only reflect the effects for Democratic candidates, and the effects for Republican candidates should be adjusted by the values in the three-way interaction term. For this reason, Figure 3a and Figure 3b should be referenced to understand the effects of racism and sexism and their interaction with perceived candidates' ideology from candidates across the parties.<sup>12</sup>

## Discussion

According to the results from the main models (i.e., Table 8), respondents who score higher on racism or sexism measures tend to evaluate politicians that are perceived to be more conservative positively, and vice versa for politicians that are perceived to be more liberal. This is the case across candidates for president and House of Representative. Therefore, these results confirm Hypothesis 1. Reviewing Table 9, the results are somewhat similar to that of Table 8—in these models, the perceived ideology of the candidates moderates the effects of the alternative measure of racism such that respondents who score high on racism tend to evaluate politicians who are perceived to be more liberal. However, the pattern seems to attenuate (as opposed to completely reverse) for candidates who are perceived to be more conservative.

The pattern observed in Figure 3b seems less symmetrical than that of Figure 3a. It is possible that respondents' response bias contributes to this somewhat lopsided pattern. Because the alternative racism measure and the dependent variable were both measured using feeling thermometers, it is likely that these two variables have shared measurement variances (i.e., feeling thermometers that are theoretically unrelated may be correlated positively). Consequently, the theoretically positive correlation between the feeling thermometer for Blacks and feeling thermometers for liberal candidates may be exaggerated while the theoretically negative correlation between the feeling thermometer for Blacks and feeling thermometers for conservative candidates

<sup>11</sup> More details about this dataset can be found at <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/anes-time-series-cumulative-data-file/>.

<sup>12</sup> To understand the effects for candidates from different parties, readers may refer to Figure F1 in Appendix F, which describes the main models that were plotted separately for Democratic candidates and Republican candidates.

Table 8  
*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Resentment Scale) and Sexism on Evaluation of Politicians in Study 3*

Models	Racism as prejudice				Sexism as prejudice							
	M1. Presidential candidate		M2. House candidate		M3. Presidential candidate		M4. House candidate					
	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI			
Candidate party (1 = Rep)	-0.49***	0.02	[-0.53, -0.46]	0.01	0.04	[-0.07, 0.11]	0.15***	0.01	[0.12, 0.17]	0.11***	0.02	[0.08, 0.14]
Perceived candidate's conservatism	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]	-0.10*	0.05	[-0.19, -0.02]	0.31***	0.01	[0.29, 0.34]	0.15***	0.02	[0.12, 0.19]
Prejudice	-0.68***	0.01	[-0.71, -0.66]	-0.43***	0.03	[-0.49, -0.36]	-0.19***	0.01	[-0.21, -0.16]	-0.21***	0.02	[-0.26, -0.17]
Candidate Party × Prejudice	0.86***	0.03	[0.81, 0.92]	0.12	0.07	[-0.01, 0.25]	0.07**	0.03	[0.02, 0.12]	-0.04	0.04	[-0.12, 0.04]
Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Prejudice	0.70***	0.03	[0.63, 0.76]	0.63***	0.07	[0.49, 0.76]	0.24***	0.03	[0.18, 0.29]	0.33***	0.04	[0.24, 0.42]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism	-0.19***	0.03	[-0.25, -0.13]	-0.35***	0.07	[-0.49, -0.21]	-0.43***	0.02	[-0.46, -0.39]	-0.32***	0.03	[-0.37, -0.26]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Prejudice	-0.24***	0.05	[-0.33, -0.15]	0.18	0.11	[-0.03, 0.4]	0.16***	0.04	[0.08, 0.25]	0.29***	0.07	[0.15, 0.42]
1976							0.01	0.01	[-0.00, 0.03]			
1980							-0.05***	0.01	[-0.07, -0.04]			
1982							-0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0]			
1984							0.00	0.01	[-0.01, 0.02]			
1988												
1990												
1992							-0.05***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.04]			
1994							-0.03***	0.01	[-0.05, -0.02]			
1996							-0.03***	0.01	[-0.05, -0.02]			
1998							-0.01	0.01	[-0.04, 0]			
2000							-0.04***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.02]			
2004							-0.03***	0.01	[-0.04, -0.01]			
2008							-0.06***	0.01	[-0.07, -0.05]			
2012							-0.18***	0.01	[-0.19, -0.17]			
2016							0.91***	0.01	[0.89, 0.93]			
Constant	30,741			0.77***	0.02	[0.73, 0.82]	0.51***	0.01	[0.49, 0.52]	0.62***	0.01	[0.60, 0.64]
Observations	15,750			5,400			25,043			9,091		
Number of groups				379			12,983			349		

Note. CI = confidence interval. "Prejudice" refers to "racism" in the models that are under "Racism as Prejudice" (i.e., M1, M2). "Prejudice" refers to "sexism" in the models that are under "Sexism as Prejudice" (i.e., M3, M4). Baseline year for M1 is 1988, M2 is 1986, M3 is 1972, M4 is 1978. All "0" denotes values that are between -.01 and .01.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .




Figure 3. (a) Adjusted effects of racism (racial resentment) and sexism (women's place is at home) on candidate support by prejudice type, candidate type, and perceived ideology with 95% confidence interval (CI). (b) Predicted effect of alternative racism measure (reverse coded feeling thermometer for Black) on candidates support by perceived candidate ideology. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

attenuated, resulting in the pattern observed in Figure 3b. Regardless, the moderating effect of a candidate's ideology is significant throughout the models, and overall, the evidence from Study 3 supports Hypothesis 1.

### Study 4

Studies 1 through 3 found that the evidence overall supports Hypothesis 1 over Hypothesis 2. Though the measures for sexism are

Table 9  
*Predictive Effect of Racism (Racial Prejudice Index) on Evaluation of Politicians in Study 3*

Models	Presidential candidate			House candidate		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
Candidate party (1 = Rep)	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.09, -0.05]	0.09***	0.02	[0.04, 0.13]
Perceived candidate's conservatism	0.35***	0.01	[0.33, 0.38]	0.13***	0.02	[0.09, 0.17]
Racism	-0.44***	0.01	[-0.46, -0.41]	-0.33***	0.03	[-0.39, -0.28]
Candidate Party × Racism	0.56***	0.03	[0.51, 0.62]	0.02	0.05	[-0.08, 0.12]
Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Racism	0.21***	0.03	[0.15, 0.28]	0.34***	0.06	[0.23, 0.45]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism	-0.41***	0.02	[-0.44, -0.37]	-0.27***	0.03	[-0.34, -0.21]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Racism	-0.07	0.05	[-0.16, 0.03]	0.07	0.09	[-0.10, 0.24]
1976	0.01	0.01	[-0.00, 0.03]			
1980	-0.06***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.04]			
1982				-0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.02]
1984	-0.01 <sup>†</sup>	0.01	[-0.03, 0]			
1986				0.01	0.01	[-0.01, 0.03]
1988	-0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.01]			
1990				0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.02]
1992	-0.05***	0.01	[-0.07, -0.04]			
1994				-0.03**	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]
1996	-0.04***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.03]	-0.02*	0.01	[-0.04, 0]
1998				-0.03*	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]
2000	-0.04***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.02]	-0.02 <sup>†</sup>	0.01	[-0.04, 0]
2004	-0.05***	0.01	[-0.07, -0.03]	-0.03*	0.01	[-0.05, 0]
2008	-0.04***	0.01	[-0.05, -0.02]			
2012	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.06]			
2016	-0.19***	0.01	[-0.20, -0.18]			
Constant	0.62***	0.01	[0.61, 0.64]	0.64***	0.01	[0.62, 0.67]
Observations	43,201			10,610		
Number of groups	22,185			414		

Note. CI = confidence interval. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

relatively diverse and free of political content, the measures for racism frequently rely on the racial resentment scale (McConahay, 1986), a measure that is often used in past studies about racism but also frequently criticized for its similarity with political ideology (see discussions in Study 1). Furthermore, in Studies 1 through 3, the racism measures are saliently and specifically about racial attitudes toward Blacks, as opposed to prejudice toward racial outgroups in general. Therefore, it is also unclear if the moderating effect of ideology can only be captured with racism measures that are specifically about Blacks. As a result, the usage of these measures in Studies 1 through 3 may limit the broader claim about the ideological effect of racial prejudice. In light of this, Study 4 operationalizes racism with a measure that is devoid of political content and does not have any references to a particular racial out-group.

## Method

Study 4 used an experiment in an online survey distributed to Mturk participants.<sup>13</sup> Racial prejudice was measured with the evaluative bias index (Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). It measures one's preferences for maintaining an exclusive social environment that is made of people from their own racial background. This index is computed from an average level of agreement to six questions ( $\alpha = .86$ ) such as "I would rather work alongside people of my same racial/ethnic origin." Therefore, this measure is not only free of political undertone, when compared with the racial resentment scale that Studies 1 through 3 use, but also not specific to the racial group that it mentions.

For the theoretical dependent variable, participants were asked to evaluate a hypothetical politician using the same two items ( $\alpha = .96$ ) from Study 2. The politician's ideology and race were manipulated with a 2 (conservative vs. liberal) × 2 (Black vs. White) design (each cell containing 219 or 220 participants) using materials similar to that of Study 2 except that only the male politicians from Study 2 were used and no information about their party affiliation was provided. In other words, in this study, the politician's gender and party were not manipulated as in Study 2.

## Results

A D\_Ideology variable and a D\_Race variable were created in the same way as in Study 2, and models were estimated using their interactions with the racism variable together (M1) as well as individually (M2 and M3). A model without interaction term was also estimated (M4) as a baseline model for comparison, which will be discussed in the general discussion.<sup>14</sup> The results are summarized in Table 10. The pattern of results is similar to that of Study 2. The significance of the interaction between the racism variable and the variable for the ideology condition (D\_Ideology × Racism) indicates

<sup>13</sup> The analyses only include the responses identified as "uncontaminated" (see Bai, 2018) using Prims, Sisso, and Bai's (2018) method (see <https://itaysisso.shinyapps.io/Bots/>).

<sup>14</sup> An additional model similar to M1 was estimated to include a three-way interaction term for D\_Ideology × D\_Race × Racism, but this term is not significant ( $b = -.09, p = .360$ ).

Table 10  
*Predictive Effect of Racism (Evaluative Bias Index) on Evaluation of Politicians in Study 4*

Models	M1. Moderator include both			M2. D_Ideology as moderator			M3. D_Race as moderator			M4. No moderator		
	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI
Racism	-0.69***	0.08	[-0.85, -0.52]	-0.62***	0.07	[-0.75, -0.48]	-0.03	0.07	[-0.17, 0.11]	0.02	0.05	[-0.08, 0.12]
D_Race	-0.12**	0.04	[-0.20, -0.04]	-0.07***	0.02	[-0.11, -0.03]	-0.12**	0.04	[-0.20, -0.03]	-0.08***	0.02	[-0.12, -0.03]
D_Ideology	-0.62***	0.04	[-0.70, -0.54]	-0.62***	0.04	[-0.70, -0.54]	-0.18***	0.02	[-0.22, -0.14]	-0.18***	0.02	[-0.22, -0.14]
D_Race × Racism	0.14	0.09	[-0.04, 0.33]				0.11	0.1	[-0.09, 0.31]			
D_Ideo × Racism	1.21***	0.09	[1.03, 1.4]	1.21***	0.09	[1.03, 1.4]						
Constant	0.95***	0.04	[0.86, 1]	0.90***	0.03	[0.84, 0.96]	0.69***	0.03	[0.63, 0.76]	0.67***	0.03	[0.62, 0.73]
Observations	874			874			874			874		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.24			0.23			0.09			0.09		

Note. CI = confidence interval.  
 \*\*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*  $p < .001$ .

that the relationship between racial prejudice and support for a politician is determined by the politician’s ideology. This pattern can be observed in Figure 4, which was plotted based on results from M1 in Table 10. In contrast, the interaction between racism and the race condition is not significant, suggesting that the race of a politician, again, fails not only to play a primary moderating role, but it does not seem to play any role at all. This observation was confirmed in an additional analysis of the model comparison between M1 and M2,  $\chi^2(1) = 2.26, p = .13$ , which shows that M2 is not a significant reduction of M1.

**Discussion**

In short, results from Study 4 found support for Hypothesis 1 but no support for Hypothesis 2, similar to the results from Studies 1 through 3 in terms of its predominant support for Hypothesis 1 over Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, using the evaluative bias index as a measure of racism, Study 4 demonstrates that the patterns found in Studies 1 through 3 can still be observed using a racism measure that is devoid of political content as well as salient references to Blacks.

**Study 5**

Finally, Study 5 attempts to test whether the patterns unveiled from Studies 1 through 4 generalize to any domain of prejudice beyond race and gender. In particular, this study focuses on the effect of prejudice against Muslims. There are several considerations for this choice. In western societies, prejudice against Muslims is particularly pervasive (Gallup, n.d.). As the number of Muslims running for, and elected to political office in western societies grows at an unprecedented rate (e.g., Chapman, 2017; Raaphelson, 2018), investigating the effect of prejudice against Muslims would be particularly relevant and timely. Furthermore, recent studies show that Americans are willing to express more prejudice against Muslim than all other major racial and religious groups in the United States (Edgell, Hartmann, Stewart, & Gerteis, 2016). Thus, Americans may find it more socially permissible to indicate that they are unwilling to support a politician because of their Muslim background. As a result, Study 5’s focus on prejudice against Muslims may make it a more stringent test for Hypothesis 1 against Hypothesis 2 compared with Studies 1 through 4.




Figure 4. Effect of racism (evaluative bias index) by ideology condition. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

## Method

Parallel to Study 4, this study tests if prejudice against Muslims predicts support for a politician based on whether the politician is liberal or conservative or whether the politician is Muslim or Christian using a  $2 \times 2$  experiment (each cell containing 253 to 256 participants). The design is, therefore, very similar to Study 4, except that the politician's religious affiliation, not race, was manipulated.

This Study was an experiment in an online survey distributed to MTurk participants<sup>15</sup>, and it measures support for a politician in the same way as Study 4 ( $\alpha = .96$ ). Prejudice against Muslims was measured with a reverse coded feeling thermometer for Muslims. It is worthwhile to note that a feeling thermometer for Muslims is syntactically similar to a feeling thermometer for a Muslim politician, the latter of which account for half of the variances in the dependent variable. As a result, these two feeling thermometers may be predisposed to covary with each other, making it a little bit easier to detect the effect described in Hypothesis 2.<sup>16</sup> To find support for Hypothesis 1 over Hypothesis 2, the moderating effect of politician's ideology needs to prevail the moderating effect of politician's religion, if any, *in addition to* overcoming the variances from the syntactic similarity described above. Thus, this may further render Study 5 a more demanding test for the current theory that the predictive effect of prejudice on support for politicians is primarily ideological.

## Results

A D\_Ideology variable was created like Study 4, and a D\_Religion variable (0 = Muslim politician, 1 = Christian politician) was created similar to that of D\_Race in Study 4. Three models were estimated using interactions between the indicators and prejudice measure together (M1) as well as individually (M2 and M3). A model without interaction term was also estimated (M4) as a baseline model for comparison, which will be discussed in the general discussion. The results are summarized in Table 11.<sup>17</sup> The pattern of results is somewhat similar to that of Study 4. The significance of the interaction between prejudice and ideology condition (D\_Ideology  $\times$  prejudice) indicates that the relationship between racial prejudice and support for a politician is determined by the politician's ideology (see Figure 5, which was plotted based on results from M1 in Table 11).

Different from the other studies with similar design (i.e., Study 2 and Study 4), the interaction between prejudice and demographic condition is significant. This suggests that the demographic background of the candidate in this case may still play a role as a moderator. When comparing the effect size for the two moderators, however, the moderating effect of the candidate's ideology, partial  $\eta^2 = 10.07\%$ , is still much more powerful than the moderating effect of the candidate's religion, partial  $\eta^2 = 0.89\%$ , as the former accounts for over 10 times the variances than the latter. The general discussion section will discuss what might explain the demographic effect discovered in this study.

## Discussion

Therefore, in short, with the more stringent test that relies on a feeling thermometer for Muslim, results from Study 5 still offer far




Figure 5. Effect of prejudice against Muslim by ideology condition. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

more support for Hypothesis 1 than Hypothesis 2, confirming the overall pattern discovered in Studies 1 through 4. Furthermore, these results show that the patterns discovered from Studies 1 through 4 are generalizable to a domain of prejudice other than race and gender, showing that, again, the predictive effect of prejudice on support for a candidate is indeed moderated primarily by the candidate's ideology, not the candidate's demographic background.

## General Discussion

Throughout the studies, politicians' ideology was consistently found to be a powerful moderator for the predictive effect of prejudice. The evidence for the effects of politicians' demographic background, however, are mixed at best. Only results from Study 1b and Study 5 have found that the interaction terms associated with politicians' demographic background are significant. As discussed in Study 1b, the significant effect for politicians' race in Study 1b could be an artifact caused by unbalanced ideological orientations of the politicians compared in the model. This interpretation is corroborated by a lack of corresponding effect in Study 2 and Study 4, both of which experimentally fix the ideology of target politicians. The significant effect of politicians' religion in Study 5 suggests that the demographic background of the politician, at least in terms of religious identification, may still play a role as a moderator. For one thing, Study 5 discussed some reasons that prejudice against Muslim, in particular, operationalized as a

<sup>15</sup> Like in Study 4, the analyses only include the responses identified as "uncontaminated" using Prims, Sisso, and Bai's (2018) method (see <https://itaysisso.shinyapps.io/Bots/>).

<sup>16</sup> Though the same can be said about the analyses that use the racial prejudice index in Study 1a, Study 1b, and Study 2, which consists of a feeling thermometer for Blacks and other items, the syntactic similarity effect in these studies may be more attenuated because they are combined with several other items that are worded and anchored differently.

<sup>17</sup> An additional model similar to M1 was estimated to include a three-way interaction term for D\_Ideology  $\times$  D\_Religion  $\times$  Prejudice, but this term is only marginally significant ( $b = -.13$ ,  $p = .071$ ).

Table 11  
Predictive Effect of Prejudice Against Muslim on Evaluation of Politicians in Study 5

Models	M1. Moderator include both			M2. D_Ideology as moderator			M3. D_Religion as moderator			M4. No moderator		
	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI
Prejudice (against Muslim)	-.59***	0.06	[-0.70, -0.47]	-.49***	0.05	[-0.58, -0.41]	-.26***	0.05	[-0.36, -0.16]	-.15***	0.03	[-0.21, -0.08]
D_Religion	-.09**	0.03	[-0.16, -0.03]	-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.03]	-.10**	0.04	[-0.17, -0.03]	-0.00	0.02	[-0.04, 0.04]
D_Ideology	-.50***	0.03	[-0.57, -0.44]	-.51***	0.03	[-0.57, -0.44]	-.21***	0.02	[-0.25, -0.17]	-.21***	0.02	[-0.24, -0.17]
D_Religion × Prejudice	0.20**	0.07	[0.07, 0.32]				0.22**	0.07	[0.08, 0.36]			
D_Ideology × Prejudice	0.69***	0.07	[0.56, 0.82]	0.70***	0.07	[0.57, 0.83]						
Constant	0.88***	0.03	[0.83, 0.94]	0.84***	0.03	[0.79, 0.89]	0.74***	0.03	[0.69, 0.8]	0.69***	0.02	[0.65, 0.74]
Observations	998			998			998			998		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.21			0.20			0.12			0.11		

Note. CI = confidence interval. All “0” denotes values that are between -.01 and .01.  
\*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001.

feeling thermometer in the design, may make it easier to find the demographic effect. However, theoretically, it is also possible that this is because religious identity, different from racial and gender identity, is an ideology itself, as it is undergirded by one’s values, belief, and worldview. As a result, when one evaluates a political candidate in the ideological fashion described in Hypothesis 1, one may still take into consideration the candidate’s religious identity. Regardless, in both Study 1b and Study 5, the moderating effects of demographic background are substantially smaller than that of ideology.

Reviewing all studies together, the results are predominantly supportive of the “politically ideological” hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), but support for the “demographically prejudicial” hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) is rather limited. In other words, the relationship between prejudice and support for political candidates is primarily determined by the (perceived) ideology of the political candidate. In contrast, based on the current studies, it is unlikely that the demographic characteristics (i.e., race, gender, and religious affiliation tested in the current studies) of the politicians play a primary role in determining the direction of the relationship.

### Robustness of the Results in Terms of Operationalization, Model Specification, and Political Context

Though the operationalizations of sexism from Studies 1 through 3 rely on a relatively diverse types of measures devoid of direct political undertone, that of racism more frequently relies on the racial resentment scale. To address this limitation, the primary models from Study 1 through Study 3 were supplemented with parallel models that use alternative measures of racial prejudice devoid of political content (either a feeling thermometer for Black, as in Study 3, or an index that is consists of the feeling thermometer and belief that Blacks are unintelligent, lazy, or violent, as in the remaining studies). These results still provide more support for Hypothesis 1 than Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, Study 4 shows that measuring racism with an alternative measure that is not only free of political content but also unambiguous in its references to racial groups yields similar results. Similarly, Study 5 focuses on a different domain of prejudice, that is, prejudice against Muslim, and it still found that a candidate’s ideology is the primary moderator. Therefore, taken together, the overall pattern is relatively invariant to the operationalization of prejudice.

The findings from the current studies are not explained by the alternative explanation of partisan cues (as shown in Study 2) and the pattern was observed among candidates of the Democratic as well as Republican parties (as shown in Study 3). The results are also robust to alternative model specifications—all models in all studies (other than Study 1a, as the control variables were not available for most subjects in Study 1a) were reestimated controlling for gender, age, education (except that education was not measured in Study 4 and Study 5), income, party affiliation, and ideology. The interaction between politicians’ ideology and prejudice remains significant in all but one model, and in no case did politicians’ demographic background overtakes the primary moderator status of politicians’ ideology (see Appendix G, Tables G2

through G11).<sup>18</sup> Therefore, Hypothesis 1 consistently receives more support than Hypothesis 2, regardless of model specifications.

It is also worthwhile to note that this overall pattern is not bounded by the following two types of political environment. First, the pattern is not limited to a political context where a nominee from a conservative party and a nominee from a liberal party are competing for the same position. In particular, the data for Study 1b was collected in January 2016, a time when Democratic and Republican presidential candidates were still competing for nominations from their own party. As shown in the results, even though a Black candidate (i.e., Carson) and a female candidate (i.e., Fiorina) were competing with White males (e.g., Trump) for the same position, they still benefited from racism and sexism. In contrast, even though a White male (i.e., Sanders) was competing with a White female (Clinton), he was still undermined by racism and sexism.<sup>19</sup> Second, it should also be noted that the moderating effect of politician's ideology is unlikely to be unique to the most recent decade or so, during which a racial minority (i.e., Obama) and a female candidate (Clinton) were nominated as a presidential candidate by a major political party in the United States. As shown in the analyses associated with support for the House of Representatives candidates in Study 3, the moderating effect of candidate ideology was observed before 2004, a time that precedes the presidential candidacy of Obama and Clinton.

### Theoretical Contributions and Qualifications for the Claims

Taken together, these results provide compelling evidence that the relationship between prejudice and support for political candidates, compared with prior theories (e.g., Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016), is better and more parsimoniously explained by the politically ideological perspective (i.e., the left side of Figure 1) than the demographically prejudicial perspective (i.e., the right side of Figure 1). Thus, this article contributes to the literature about how citizens' prejudice may be translated into their political preference by updating our understanding about whether racism and sexism by themselves undermine racial minority candidates, such as Obama, and female candidates, such as Clinton, because of their race and gender.

It is also noteworthy that across all experimental studies reported in this article (i.e., Study 2, Study 4, and Study 5), results show that minority and female politicians are *not* undermined by their demographic background as a main effect. That is, participants on average did *not* evaluate the candidates who are Black, women or Muslim any less than candidates who are White, male, or Christian. This is reflected in the baseline models without moderators, where the indicator variables for the politicians' demographic background are either not significant, or (marginally) significant in the *opposite* direction that one would expect from the demographically prejudicial perspective (i.e., M6 in Study 2, M4 in Study 4 and Study 5). In particular, D\_Gender is not significant in Study 2 and D\_Religion is not significant in Study 5, suggesting that whether a candidate is man or a woman, a Christian or a Muslim has no bearing on how much participants support them. Though D\_Race is not significant in Table 6, it is marginally significant in Table 7 in Study 2 and significant in Study 4 negatively. Therefore, if anything, these results suggest that par-

ticipants consider a Black candidate to be a little bit more desirable than a White candidate. These results, therefore, provide an even stronger case against the demographically prejudicial perspective.<sup>20</sup>

To answer the questions discussed in the beginning of the article, there is very limited evidence that prejudice can contribute to social injustice by hampering citizens' support for the growing number of racial minority and women politicians (Geiger et al., 2019) because of the politicians' demographic background. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that prejudice can contribute to injustices in society as a whole by guiding citizens to support candidates whose policies structurally and institutionally undermine progress toward social equality, harming the growing number of citizens who are minorities (Cilluffo & Fry, 2019) and women who are entering the workforce (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).

There are some qualifications or clarifications that should be made for this article's claims. This article does not argue that politicians' demographic background such as their race and gender do not matter at all for political candidates. There are two reasons for this qualification. First, the studies reported in this article cannot refute the existence of citizens who just would not support a politician because of the politician's demographic background. Though these findings suggest that for most people in recent decades (or at least the population that the samples are representative of) what a politician believes and symbolically represents matters more than who the politician is demographically, this overall trend cannot rule out the existence of people who do not follow this trend. After all, women and racial minorities have faced a long history of being denied civil participation because of their demographic background (e.g., National Archive, n.d.b; National Archive, n.d.a). Second, as shown in Study 3, one's *perceived* ideology of politicians, not necessarily the actual ideology of the politicians, can determine the effect of racism and sexism. However, a citizen may take a politician's demographic background, such as race and gender, as a cue to (perhaps incorrectly) infer their political competency as well as ideological standings (e.g., on racial issues, see Sigelman et al., 1995; on gender issues, see

<sup>18</sup> In the models that include control variables, the term for the interaction between politicians' ideology and prejudice is in general smaller, and in one case, it became not significant (i.e., in the model for presidential candidate using the feeling thermometer as the measure for racism in Study 3). In these models, it is usually either a participants' ideology or party identity, among all controls, that is significant and therefore, explains the reduced variances from the interaction terms. These patterns suggest the participants' ideology may serve as a mediator for the effect of prejudice, which is in fact consistent with the current theory, as it assumes that the political expression of prejudice is ideological. There are also several other differences in these models that include additional control variables. For example, D\_Race  $\times$  Racism in Study 4 became significant, though it has a much smaller effect than D\_Ideology  $\times$  Racism.

<sup>19</sup> Consistent with this notion, even for candidates who are from the same party, the effect of racism and sexism on support for them is moderated by their perceived ideology (see Appendix F). This suggests that a political context where a nominee from a conservative party and a nominee from a liberal party are competing for the same position is not a necessary condition for the ideological effect of prejudice.

<sup>20</sup> Though the key prediction of the demographically prejudicial perspective is an interactional effect, this finding still provides a case against it. The underlying logic for this is discussed in detail in Appendix H.

Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993). As past studies suggest, Blacks and women are on average perceived to be more liberal while Whites and men are perceived to be more conservative (Fulton & Gershon, 2018; Jacobsmeier, 2015; Koch, 2000). Nonetheless, focusing on the predictive effect of prejudice, it is ultimately the inferred ideological preferences of the politicians, not the race, gender or religious background per se, that determines how prejudice predicts support for the politicians.

### Limitations and Future Directions

There are some limitations in the current studies that researchers are encouraged to address in the future. First, this article, by topic, investigates the effect of prejudice on support for politicians in the United States. Therefore, it is unclear from the evidence presented in this article how well the ideological explanation of prejudice can be generalized to other countries and societies. Second, this article focuses on the relationships between different types of explicit attitude, in particular, the relationship between explicit prejudice and explicit attitude toward politicians. It is unclear if a politician's ideology moderates the effect of prejudice on attitude toward the politician in the same way as discovered in this article if either prejudice or evaluation of politician (if not both) is measured implicitly (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). There are reasons for several alternative hypotheses.

In particular, past studies showed that implicit racism predicts opposition to a health reform plan when it was attributed to Obama but not when it was attributed to Bill Clinton, suggesting a demographic explanation (Knowles, Lowery, & Schaumberg, 2010). However, it is also possible that Bill Clinton was perceived to be less liberal than Obama in the contemporary standard. As a result, it may have been more salient to respondents that the health reform plan reflects liberal ideology when it was attributed to Obama, belying an ideological mechanism. To understand whether implicit prejudice is indeed associated with support for a candidate based on their demographic background or ideology, researchers in the future should consider answering these questions empirically.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, this article suggests that the past understanding about how prejudice predicts evaluation of a politician is incomplete without considering the ideology (i.e., the political preferences) of the politician, as the relationship between prejudice and support for politicians is determined by their (perceived) ideology, more so than their demographic background.

### References

- Bai, H. (2018). *Evidence that a large amount of low quality responses on MTurk can be detected with repeated GPS coordinates*. Retrieved from <http://www.maxhuibai.com/1/post/2018/08/evidence-that-responses-from-repeating-gps-are-random.html>
- Bock, J., Byrd-Craven, J., & Burkley, M. (2017). The role of sexism in voting in the 2016 presidential election. *Personality and Individual Differences, 119*, 189–193. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.07.026>
- Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23*, 27–34. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721413510932>
- Carlin, D. B., & Winfrey, K. L. (2009). Have you come a long way, baby? Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and sexism in 2008 campaign coverage. *Communication Studies, 60*, 326–343.
- Carney, R. K., & Enos, R. D. (2015). *Conservatism, just world belief, and racism: An experimental investigation of the attitudes measured by modern racism scales*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Chambers, J. R., Schlenker, B. R., & Collisson, B. (2013). Ideology and prejudice: The role of value conflicts. *Psychological Science, 24*, 140–149. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612447820>
- Chapman, H. (2017, 23 June). Record number of Muslim MPs elected. *The Muslim News*. Retrieved from <http://muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/home-news/record-number-muslim-mps-elected/>
- Cilluffo, A., & Fry, R. (2019). *An early look at the 2020 electorate*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/essay/an-early-look-at-the-2020-electorate/>
- Citir, J., Green, D. P., & Sears, D. O. (1990). White reactions to black candidates: When does race matter? *Public Opinion Quarterly, 54*, 74–96. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/269185>
- Cohen, J. E. (1988). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Inc.
- Dwyer, C. E., Stevens, D., Sullivan, J. L., & Allen, B. (2009). Racism, sexism, and candidate evaluations in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 9*, 223–240. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2009.01187.x>
- Edgell, P., Hartmann, D., Stewart, E., & Gerteis, J. (2016). Atheists and other cultural outsiders: Moral boundaries and the non-religious in the United States. *Social Forces, 95*, 607–638. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/sow063>
- Feldman, S., & Huddy, L. (2005). Racial resentment and white opposition to race-conscious programs: Principles or prejudice? *American Journal of Political Science, 49*, 168–183. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00117.x>
- Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. *The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2*, 357–411.
- Fulton, S. A., & Gershon, S. A. (2018). Too liberal to win? Race and voter perceptions of candidate ideology. *American Politics Research, 46*, 909–939. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X18759642>
- Gallup. (n.d.). *Islamophobia: understanding anti-Muslim sentiment in the west*. Retrieved from <https://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx>
- Geiger, A. W., Bialik, K., & Gramlich, J. (2019). *The changing face of Congress in 6 charts*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/15/the-changing-face-of-congress/>
- Gervais, S. J., & Hillard, A. L. (2011). A role congruity perspective on prejudice toward Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 11*, 221–240. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2011.01263.x>
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The ambivalent sexism inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70*, 491–512. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.3.491>
- Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 1464–1480. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464>
- Highton, B. (2004). White voters and African American candidates for congress. *Political Behavior, 26*, 1–25. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:POBE.0000022341.98720.9e>
- Huddy, L., & Terkildsen, N. (1993). Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female candidates. *American Journal of Political Science, 37*, 119–147.
- Jacobsmeier, M. L. (2015). From Black and White to left and right: Race, perceptions of candidates' ideologies, and voting behavior in U.S. House

- elections. *Political Behavior*, 37, 595–621. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-014-9283-3>
- Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of system-justifying ideologies. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 14, 260–265. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00377.x>
- Knowles, E. D., Lowery, B. S., & Schaumberg, R. L. (2010). Racial prejudice predicts opposition to Obama and his health care reform plan. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 46, 420–423. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.10.011>
- Koch, J. W. (2000). Do citizens apply gender stereotypes to infer candidates' ideological orientations? *The Journal of Politics*, 62, 414–429. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00019>
- Lerman, A. E., & Sadin, M. L. (2016). Stereotyping or projection? How white and black voters estimate black candidates' ideology. *Political Psychology*, 37, 147–163. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12235>
- McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 91–125). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Miller, A. L., & Borgida, E. (2016). The separate spheres model of gendered inequality. *PLoS ONE*, 11, e0147315. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147315>
- Miller, A. L., & Borgida, E. (2019). The temporal dimension of system justification: Gender ideology over the course of the 2016 election. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 45, 1057–1067. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167218804547>
- Moskowitz, D., & Stroh, P. (1994). Psychological sources of electoral racism. *Political Psychology*, 15, 307–329. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3791741>
- National Archive. (n.d.a). *15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Voting Rights (1870)*. Retrieved from <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=44>
- National Archive. (n.d.b). *19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women's Right to Vote (1920)*. Retrieved from <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=63>
- Payne, B. K., Krosnick, J. A., Pasek, J., Lelkes, Y., Akhtar, O., & Tompson, T. (2010). Implicit and explicit prejudice in the 2008 American presidential election. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 46, 367–374. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.11.001>
- Prims, J. P., Sisso, I., & Bai, H. (2018). *Suspicious IP online flagging tool*. Retrieved from <https://itaysisso.shinyapps.io/Bots>
- Raaphelson, S. (2018). *Muslim Americans running for office in highest numbers since 2001*. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2018/07/18/630132952/muslim-americans-running-for-office-in-highest-numbers-since-2001>
- Ratliff, K. A., Redford, L., Conway, J., & Smith, C. T. (2019). Engendering support: Hostile sexism predicts voting for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 22, 578–593. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430217741203>
- Reeves, K. (1997). *Voting hopes or fears? white voters, black candidates, and racial politics in America*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Sigelman, C. K., Sigelman, L., Walkosz, B. J., & Nitz, M. (1995). Black candidates, white voters. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39, 243–265. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111765>
- Sniderman, P. M., & Tetlock, P. E. (1986). Symbolic racism: Problems of motive attribution in political analysis. *Journal of Social Issues*, 42, 129–150. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1986.tb00229.x>
- Tarman, C., & Sears, D. O. (2005). The conceptualization and measurement of symbolic racism. *The Journal of Politics*, 67, 731–761. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00337.x>
- Terkildsen, N. (1993). When white voters evaluate black candidates: The processing implications of candidate skin color, prejudice, and self-monitoring. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37, 1032–1053. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2111542>
- Tesler, M. (2013). The return of old-fashioned racism to White Americans' partisan preferences in the early Obama era. *The Journal of Politics*, 75, 110–123.
- Tesler, M. (2016). *Post-racial or most-racial?: Race and politics in the Obama era*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226353159.001.0001>
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2018). *Women in the labor force: A databook*. Retrieved from <https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-databook/2018/home.htm>
- Voss, D. S., & Lublin, D. (2001). Black incumbents, white districts. *American Politics Research*, 29, 141–182. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X01029002002>
- Wolsko, C., Park, B., & Judd, C. M. (2006). Considering the Tower of Babel: Correlates of assimilation and multiculturalism among ethnic minority and majority groups in the United States. *Social Justice Research*, 19, 277–306. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-006-0014-8>

(Appendices follow)

## Appendix A

### All Measures, Materials, Descriptives, and Correlations

#### Measure of Racism

This appendix describes measures used in all studies and the correlations between all variables across studies. It should be noted that all ideology and party identity variables in all tables, other than in Table A2 and Table A4, were coded in such a way that a higher score means more similar to that of the politician evaluated by participants. The ideology and party identity variables in Table A2 and Table A4 were coded such that a higher score means more conservative or stronger Republican identity.

**Racism** in terms of racial resentment was measured using the following four items across Studies 1 through 3. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the statements below from 1 = *disagree strongly* to 5 = *agree strongly*. Items noted with R are reverse coded

1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. R
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. R

**Racism** in terms of evaluative bias index was measured using the following six items in Study 4. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the statements below from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*. Items noted with R are reverse coded

1. I would be completely comfortable in a social setting (such as a dance club or bar) where there were very few people from my racial/ethnic group. R
2. I would be completely comfortable dating someone from a different racial/ethnic group (if I was single). R
3. It would bother me if my child married someone from a different racial/ethnic background.

4. I would prefer to live in a neighborhood with people of my same racial/ethnic origin.
5. If I were living with others in a house or an apartment, I would be more comfortable if my roommates were from my same racial/ethnic background.
6. I would rather work alongside people of my same racial/ethnic origin.

#### Measure of Sexism

Sexism is measured differently in different studies. In **Study 1a**, it is measured using the following items. Each item is recoded so that a higher score indicates a greater level of sexism (see analytic script for details). The items are then rescaled to range from 0 to 1 so that they are weighted equally and then averaged to form a scale.

1. How serious a problem is discrimination against women in the United States? Not a problem at all, a minor problem, a moderately serious problem, a very serious problem, or an extremely serious problem?  
Not a problem at all [1]  
A minor problem [2]  
A moderately serious problem [3]  
A very serious problem [4]  
An extremely serious problem [5]
2. Should the news media pay more attention to discrimination against women, less attention, or the same amount of attention they have been paying lately?  
More attention [1]  
Less attention [2]  
Same amount of attention [3]
3. When women demand equality these days, how often are they actually seeking special favors? Never, some of the time, about half the time, most of the time, or always?  
Never [1]  
Some of the time [2]  
About half the time [3]  
Most of the time [4]  
Always [5]

(Appendices continue)

Table A1  
Study 1a Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1. Obama	2. Banders	3. Clinton	4. Carson	5. Fiorina	6. Trump	7. Racism1	8. Sexism
1. Obama	0.61	0.3								
2. Banders	0.55	0.26	.53***							
3. Clinton	0.52	0.29	.73***	.34***						
4. Carson	0.47	0.26	-.24***	-.10*	-.13**					
5. Fiorina	0.43	0.23	-.24***	-.19***	-0.1†	.67***				
6. Trump	0.51	0.26	-.39***	-.22***	-.21***	.25***	0.10			
7. Racism1	0.57	0.27	-.51***	-.43***	-.34***	.30***	.29***	.43***		
8. Sexism	0.46	0.16	-.35***	-.36***	-.32***	.34***	.28***	.21***	.44***	
9. Racism2	0.43	0.18	-.24***	-.16***	-.21***	0.05	0.02	.12*	.39***	.24***

Note. Variables 1 through 8 refer to the feeling thermometers for each candidate. Racism1 denotes the racial resentment, and racism2 is the alternative measure for racism. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.

†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

4. When employers make decisions about hiring and promotion, how often do they discriminate against women? Never, some of the time, about half the time, most of the time, or always?

Never [1]

Some of the time [2]

About half the time [3]

Most of the time [4]

Always [5]

5. When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more problems than they solve?

Never [1]

Some of the time [2]

About half the time [3]

Most of the time [4]

Always [5]

6. In the U.S. today, do men have more opportunities for achievement than women have, do women have more opportunities than men, or do they have equal opportunities?]

Men have many more [1]

Men have moderately more [2]

Men have slightly more [3]

Equal opportunities [4]

Women have slightly more [5]

Women have moderately more [6]

Women have many more [7]

Table A2  
Study 1b Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1. Obama	2. Banders	3. Clinton	4. Carson	5. Fiorina	6. Trump	7. Racism1	8. Sexism	9. Racism2	10. Age	11. Education	12. Income	13. Party
1. Obama	0.49	0.38													
2. Banders	0.5	0.33	.61***												
3. Clinton	0.43	0.37	.79***	.49***											
4. Carson	0.42	0.31	-.49***	-.35***	-.41***										
5. Fiorina	0.37	0.27	-.41***	-.27***	-.32***	.72***									
6. Trump	0.38	0.37	-.59***	-.40***	-.45***	.50***	.41***								
7. Racism1	0.58	0.30	-.64***	-.50***	-.49***	.46***	.43***	.55***							
8. Sexism	0.18	0.26	-.28***	-.33***	-.27***	.24***	.19***	.17***	.24***						
9. Racism2	0.35	0.25	-.35***	-.32***	-.28**	.14***	.12***	.32***	.49***	.22***					
10. Age	0.63	0.22	-.16***	-.14***	-0.05	.11***	.08**	.17***	.16***	-.06*	-0.02				
11. Education	0.44	0.30	0.04	.06*	0	0.01	0.02	-.07*	-.15***	0.02	-.17***	-.06*			
12. Income	0.31	0.22	-0.03	0.03	-.07*	0.01	0.05	0	-.09**	-0.02	-.09**	0.01	.41***		
13. Party	0.43	0.35	-.73***	-.53***	-.68***	.50***	.44***	.54***	.51***	.25***	.25***	.09**	0	.07*	
14. Ideology	0.50	0.29	-.62***	-.58***	-.54***	.54***	.45***	.50***	.55***	.31***	.29***	.17***	-.07*	-0.01	.63***

Note. Variables 1 through 6 refer to the feeling thermometers for each candidate. Racism1 denotes the racial resentment, and racism2 is the alternative measure for racism. All "0" denotes values that are between -.01 and .01.

†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

Table A3  
Study 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.
			Candidate_eval	Racism1	Sexism	Sexism2	Racism2	D_ideo	D_party	D_race	D_gender	Gender	Age	Education	Income	Party
1. Candidate support	0.56	0.32														
2. Racism1	0.51	0.26	-0.02													
3. Sexism	0.44	0.16	.17***	.28***												
4. Sexism2	0.40	0.18	.16***	.33***	.65**											
5. Racism2	0.37	0.23	-.15***	.33***	0.06	.15***										
6. D_ideo	0.50	0.50	-0.04	-0.04	-.09*	-0.03	0.02									
7. D_party	0.50	0.50	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0	0.05	0.01								
8. D_race	0.50	0.50	-.07*	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	0	0							
9. D_gender	0.50	0.50	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0	0	-0.01						
10. Gender	0.51	0.50	-0.05	-.14***	-.22***	-.27***	-.07**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01					
11. Age	0.37	0.22	-.13***	.16***	-.07*	-.07*	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	0.02	-.11***				
12. Education	0.54	0.20	0.02	-.07**	0	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	-.12***	.07***			
13. Income	0.34	0.29	.07*	.06*	0.04	.08*	0	-0.04	0	0.04	-0.05	-.19***	0	.42***		
14. Party	0.50	0.39	.12***	-0.01	0.02	0	0.02	-0.04	-.07*	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	.08*	
15. Ideology	0.49	0.29	.34***	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	0	-0.04	0.02	0.01	0.05	-0.03

Note. Variables 1 through 6 refer to the feeling thermometers for each candidate. Racism1 denotes the racial resentment, and racism2 is the alternative measure for racism. Sexism is ambivalent sexism. Sexism2 is separate sphere ideology. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

In Study 1b, it is measured using the following item from 1 = favor a great deal to 7 = oppose a great deal

Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose requiring employers to pay women and men the same amount for the same work?

In Study 2 ambivalent sexism scale ("Sexism 1") is measured using the following items from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree

1. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them (H)

2. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash (H)

3. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against (H)

Table A4  
Study 3 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1. Dem. Pres.	2. Rep. Pres.	3. Dem. P. Ideo.	4. Rep. P. Ideo.	5. Dem. H.	6. Rep. H.	7. Dem. H. Ideo.	8. Rep. H. Ideo.	9. Racism1	10. Sexism	11. Racism2	12. Gender	13. Age	14. Education	15. Income	16. Party
1. Dem. Pres.	0.56	0.3																
2. Rep. Pres.	0.53	0.3	-.46***															
3. Dem. P. Ideo.	0.33	0.26	.38***	-.22***														
4. Rep. P. Ideo.	0.67	0.27	-.02***	0	-.34***													
5. Dem. H.	0.59	0.23	.41***	-.24***	.21***	-.02*												
6. Rep. H.	0.56	0.22	-.30***	.44***	-.14***	-.03***	-.16***											
7. Dem. H. Ideo.	0.44	0.23	.14***	-.02	.32***	-.21***	.24***	-.06***										
8. Rep. H. Ideo.	0.63	0.21	-.13***	.04*	-.19***	.34***	-.04*	-.02	-.19***									
9. Racism1	0.59	0.25	-.39***	.39***	-.16***	-.11	-.21***	.22***	0.03	-.09***								
10. Sexism	0.28	0.32	-.09***	.16***	-.02**	-.10***	-.02*	.13***	.06***	-0.02	.12***							
11. Racism2	0.33	0.21	-.24***	.15***	-.06***	-.03***	-.18***	-.03***	-0.01	-.08***	.33***	.10***						
12. Gender	0.55	0.50	.09***	-.03***	.05***	-.01*	.08***	.02**	.04**	-.05***	-.04***	.02***	-.10***					
13. Age	0.36	0.21	-.02***	.05***	-.11***	-.01	.08***	.09***	-.04***	0.02	.07***	.16***	.01*	.02***				
14. Education	0.5	0.32	-.10***	-.08***	-.21***	.22***	-.09***	-.03***	-.21***	.22***	-.18***	-.26***	-.06***	-.06***	-.15***			
15. Income	0.47	0.29	-.15***	.09***	-.16***	.14***	-.10***	.05***	-.12***	.12***	0	-.11***	.06***	-.13***	-.15***	.36***		
16. Party	0.44	0.35	-.62***	.55***	-.32***	.04***	-.36***	.34***	-.16***	.10***	.34***	.06***	.15***	-.05***	0.01	.13***	.14***	
17. Ideology	0.54	0.24	-.47***	.48***	-.15***	-.11***	-.24***	.32***	.09***	.07***	.40***	.24***	.13***	-.05***	.12***	-.05***	.06***	.49***

Note. Racism1 denotes the racial resentment, and racism2 is the alternative measure for racism. Variables 1 through 8, in order, refer to feeling thermometer for Democratic presidential candidates, feeling thermometer for Republican presidential candidate, perceived ideology for Democratic presidential candidates, perceived ideology for Republican presidential candidates, feeling thermometer for Democratic house candidates, and perceived ideology for Republican house candidates. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

Table A5  
Study 4 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1. Candidate_	2. Racism	3. D_ideo	4. D_race	5. Gender	6. Age	7. Income	8. Party
1. Candidate Support	0.55	0.33								
2. Racism	0.37	0.21	0.02							
3. D_ideo	0.50	0.50	-.27***	0.02						
4. D_race	0.50	0.50	-.11***	-.10**	0					
5. Gender	0.61	0.49	0.04	-.13***	-0.02	-0.03				
6. Age	0.34	0.21	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04			
7. Income	0.48	0.30	-0.03	0	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.06		
8. Party	0.52	0.26	.66***	-0.02	-.25***	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	
9. Ideology	0.51	0.31	.65***	-0.01	-.19***	-.08*	-0.02	0	-0.02	.77***

Note. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.  
\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess (B)</li> <li>5. Women should be cherished and protected by men (B)</li> <li>6. Women, compared with men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility (B)</li> <li>7. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing to provide financially for the women in their lives (B)</li> <li>8. Women, as compared with men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste (B)</li> <li>9. A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man (B)</li> <li>10. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores (B)</li> <li>11. Men are complete without women (B) R</li> <li>12. Women exaggerate problems they have at work (H)</li> <li>13. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has the love of a woman (B)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>14. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist (H)</li> </ul> <p>In <b>Study 2</b> separate sphere ideology ("Sexism 2") is measured using the following items from 1 = <i>strongly disagree</i> to 7 = <i>strongly agree</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Women can learn technical skills, but it doesn't come as naturally as it does for most men.</li> <li>2. If one person in a heterosexual marriage needs to quit working, it usually makes more sense for the husband to keep his job.</li> <li>3. Children with single parents can be just as well off as children with both a mom and a dad. R</li> <li>4. When it comes to voting for president, I'm more comfortable trusting a man to make tough political decisions than a woman.</li> <li>5. When a married couple divorces, judges shouldn't assume that the mother is the more "natural" parent. R</li> </ul> |
|--|--|

Table A6  
Study 5 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1. Candidate S.	2. Prejudice M.	3. D_ideo	4. D_religion	5. Gender	6. Age	7. Income	8. Party
1. Candidate support	0.53	0.34								
2. Muslim Prejudice	0.43	0.29	-.12***							
3. D_ideo	0.49	0.50	-.30***	-0.01						
4. D_religion	0.51	0.50	-0.02	0.03	0.03					
5. Gender	0.61	0.49	-0.02	-.06*	-0.02	0.02				
6. Age	0.30	0.20	-0.02	0.02	-0.06	0.01	.10***			
7. Income	0.49	0.29	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.04	0.03		
8. Party	0.49	0.29	.57***	-0.02	-.24***	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.03	
9. Ideology	0.49	0.30	.61***	-0.06	-.26***	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	.82***

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

6. Most men naturally enjoy a tough and competitive career more than women do. 7. I would feel more comfortable if my auto mechanic was a man, rather than a woman.
8. If we got rid of stereotyping and discrimination, differences between men and women would mostly disappear. R
9. Women can learn how to be good leaders in the workplace, but it doesn't come as naturally as it does for most men.
10. It's natural for a woman to be fulfilled by taking care of her children, but most men feel better when they have a good career, too.
11. There are certain care-giving jobs, like nursing, that just naturally fit with women's skills better than men's skills.
12. Most kids are better off if their dad is the primary provider for the whole family.
13. I would feel equally comfortable with a repair-man or a repair-woman to fix something in my house.
14. It's just as important to most women as it is to men to have a successful career. R
15. When it comes to making tough business decisions, men tend to have special abilities that most women don't have.

In **Study 3** sexism is measured using the following item:

Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. (2004: Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1) Others feel that a women's place is in the home. (2004: Suppose these people are at the other end; at point 7.) And of course, some people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.) ALL YEARS EXC. 2000 VERSION 2: Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R) 2000 VERSION 2: Where would you place yourself on this scale? (7-POINT SCALE SHOWN TO R); 1 = women and men should have an equal role, 7 = women's place is in the home.

### Measure of Politician Evaluation

In **Study 1a** and **Study 1b**, it is measured using the following item.

We'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. We'll show the name of a person or group and we'd like you to rate that person or group using something we call the feeling thermometer.

Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person.

If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just click Next and we'll move on to the next one.

Barack Obama

Bernie Sanders

Hillary Clinton

Carly Fiorina

Ben Carson

Donald Trump

In **Study 2**, the evaluation of a hypothetical candidate is measured using the following procedure. Participants read a hypothetical profile of a political candidate. The profile includes several pieces of information that are manipulated. The party affiliation is manipulated by including one of the two following texts in the beginning of the profile.

### Democrat Condition

Next, we would like to get your opinion on the following politician who was nominated as the **Democratic Party** candidate. Please read the following statement from this politician and respond to the following questions.

*(Appendices continue)*

## Republican Condition

Next, we would like to get your opinion on the following politician who was nominated as the **Republican Party** candidate. Please read the following statement from this politician and respond to the following questions.

Race and gender is manipulated by using one of the following four pictures (accessible via the links) as the profile picture: Black male (<https://bit.ly/3dGt2OR>), a White male (<https://bit.ly/2Bf04Zh>), a Black female (<https://osf.io/tbmsf/>), and a White female (<https://osf.io/j87ft/>).

The ideology of the candidate is manipulated including one of the following two statements as part of the profile

## Liberal Condition

### Statement

“All of us have the right to high-quality health care, regardless of our station in life. The Affordable Care Act guarantees this right, and it has greatly improved the well-being of the American people. Therefore, I will work to protect and strengthen the Affordable Care Act. I also believe that immigration is both good for our economy and for American culture. I believe we should continue to welcome new immigrants, and help undocumented immigrants living among us become citizens. Finally, our current tax laws favor big corporations and the rich, while the average American feels the worst of the taxman’s bite. I support a fairer tax system that benefits everyday people, rather than billionaires and corporate fat cats.”

## Conservative Condition

### Statement

“All of us have the right to freedom from government interference in our health-care decisions. The Affordable Care Act strips away this right, and it has greatly damaged the well-being of the American people. Therefore, I will work to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act. I also believe that excessive immigration is bad for our economy and weakens the unity of American culture. I believe we should reduce current immigration levels, and deport undocumented immigrants currently living among us. Finally, our current tax laws take way too much out of the average American’s paycheck and hands it to government bureaucrats. I support a fairer tax system that cuts taxes for everyone, rather than giving more of our hard-earned money to big government.”

The evaluation is measured with the following two items:

We would like to get your feelings toward this politician. Please rate this politician using the feeling thermometer that you used earlier.<sup>21</sup>

How likely do you think you will vote for this politician? Rating of 0 means that there is a 0% of chance you will do so. Rating of 100 mean that you there is a 100% of chance, and rating of 50% means that you there is a half chance you will vote for this politician.

In **Study 3**, it is measured in somewhat different ways across different waves, as described below:

1968–1974:

(1968,1972: As you know, there were many people mentioned this past year as possible candidates for President [1972: or Vice-President] by the political parties.) (1970: Several political leaders have already been mentioned as possible candidates for President in 1972.) (1968–1972: We would like to get your feelings toward some of these people.) (1974: Now I’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days.) I have here a card on which there is something that looks like a thermometer. We call it a “feeling thermometer” because it measures your feelings toward these people. (1968: You probably remember that we used something like this in our earlier interview with you.) Here’s how it works. If you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward a person, then you should place him in the middle of the thermometer, at the 50 degree mark. If you have a warm feeling toward him or feel favorably toward him, you would give him a score somewhere between 50 and 100 degrees. (1968–1970 only: depending on how warm your feeling is toward that person). On the other hand, if you don’t feel very favorably toward a person—that is, if you don’t care for him too much—then you would place him somewhere between 0 and 50 degrees. Of course, if you don’t know too much about a person, just tell me and we’ll go on to the next name. 1976: As you know, many people were mentioned this year as possible candidates for president or vice-president by the political parties. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these people. I’ll read the name of each person and I’d like you to rate that person with what we call a feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward the person, ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorably towards the person and that you don’t care too much for that person. If you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward a person you would rate them at 50 degrees. If we come to a person you don’t know much about, just tell me and we’ll move on to the next one.

<sup>21</sup> In the earlier part of the survey, participants were given the following instruction to rate various social groups and entities: Next, we would like to get your feelings toward some people and groups in the news these days. We will give you the name of a person or group, and we would like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable toward the person or group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you do not feel favorable toward the person or group and that you do not care too much for that person or group. You would rate the person or group at the 50 degree mark if you don’t feel particularly favorable or unfavorable toward the person or group. If we come to a person or group whose name you don’t recognize, you can decline to rate your feelings. Please note that you *must move the slider* to record a response.

(Appendices continue)

**1978-LATER:**

I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days (1990: have been in the news). I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using (1986-LATER: something we call) the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 (1986-LATER: degrees) mean that you feel favorably and warm toward the person; ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorably toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. (1986-LATER: You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person.) If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. (1978-1984: If you do recognize the name, but you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person, then you would rate the person at the 50 degree mark.)

[Republican candidate's name]

[Democratic candidate's name]

**Measure of Politician's Ideology (Study 3 Only)**

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.

Where would you place [the Candidate] on this scale?

1. Extremely liberal
2. Liberal
3. Slightly liberal
4. Moderate; middle of the road
5. Slightly conservative
6. Conservative
7. Extremely conservative

**Appendix B****Manipulation Check Study**

To test whether manipulations used in Study 2 are effective, a pilot study was conducted on a total of 701 undergraduate students from a large Midwest university. Participants first read the profile of the candidate, as described in the main text. Then on the next page, they were asked the four manipulation check questions after the introductory language "Based on what you can recall . . ." in the order described below (the survey did not allow participants to go back to the prior page). For the party affiliation manipulation check, they were asked "What was the party affiliation of the candidate?" with the choice of "Republican" and "Democrat." To test the effect of racial background manipulation, participants were asked "What was the racial background of the candidate?" with the choice of "Black" and "White." To test the effect of gender manipulation, they were asked "What was the sex of the candidate?" with the choice of "male" and "female." Finally, to test the effect of ideology manipulation, they were asked "What was the overall political ideological orientation of the candidate?" with the choice in a Likert scale from 1 = *very liberal*, 7 = *very conservative*.

**Results**

The detailed results can be found in the R markdown file at <https://osf.io/v2rha>. All manipulated factors were manipulated successfully. For the party identity manipulation, the majority of

participants were able to recall the party affiliation of the candidate correctly. In particular, 289 out of 339 (85.3%) participants in the Republican condition identified the party affiliation as Republican, and in the Democratic condition, 257 out of 332 (77.4%) participants identified the party affiliation as Democrat,  $\chi^2(1) = 262.82$ ,  $p < .001$ . Overall 546 out of 671 (81.4%) participants identified the candidate's party affiliation correctly.

A majority of participants were able to recall the racial background of the candidate correctly. In particular, 303 out of 332 (91.3%) participants in the White condition correctly recalled the candidate's race, and 330 out of 334 (98.8%) participants in the Black condition correctly recalled the candidate's race, which is significantly beyond the chance level,  $\chi^2(1) = 539.96$ ,  $p < .001$ . Overall 633 out of 666 (95.0%) participants identified the candidate's race correctly.

A majority of participants were able to recall the gender background of the candidate correctly as well. In particular, 301 out of 329 (91.5%) participants in the male condition correctly recalled the candidate's gender, and 332 out of 335 (99.1%) participants in the female condition correctly recalled the candidate's gender, which is significantly beyond the chance level,  $\chi^2(1) = 545.18$ ,  $p < .001$ . Overall 633 out of 664 (95.3%) participants identified the candidate's gender correctly.

*(Appendices continue)*

Participants in the liberal condition indeed perceive the politician to be more liberal  $M = 2.36$ ,  $SD = 1.29$  (for reference, 3 is labeled as “Somewhat liberal”) than participants in the conservative condition  $M = 5.38$ ,  $SD = 1.40$  (for reference, 5 is labeled with “Somewhat conservative”),  $t(661.67) = -29.03$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = -2.24$ . Furthermore, 285 out of 337 (84.6%) participants in the liberal condition recalled the candidate’s ideology to be liberal (i.e., responded with “Very liberal,” “Liberal” or “Somewhat liberal.”) There are 259 out of 333 (77.8%) participants recalled the candidate’s ideology to be liberal (i.e., responded with “Very Conservative,” “Conservative” or “Somewhat conservative.”) Overall, 544 out of 670 (81.2%) participants identified the candidate’s ideology correctly.

Two additional analyses were conducted using the ideology condition, party condition, and their interaction to predict participants’ recall of the candidate’s ideology (using linear regression) and party (using logistic regression). These analyses were conducted to test whether participants’ recall of party identity was influenced by the ideological condition that they were assigned to,

and vice versa for their recall of ideology. According to the results, both have occurred, though participants’ recall of ideology and party identity are primarily driven by the corresponding manipulations. For participants’ recall of the candidate’s ideology, partial  $\eta^2 = .58$  for ideology manipulation and  $\eta^2 = .07$  for party identity manipulation. For the association between participants’ recall of the candidate’s party and the ideology condition,  $\phi = .25$ ; in comparison, the association between participants’ recall of the candidate’s party and the party condition,  $\phi = .63$ . The ideology and party identity manipulations do not interact in determining participants’ recall of the candidate’s ideology ( $p = .119$ ), and they marginally interact in determining their recall of the candidate’s party ( $p = .051$ ).

Based on the above, most participants were able to recall all manipulated factors about the candidate correctly. Though party identity and ideology manipulation may have interfered with each other, this manipulation procedure, overall, is likely successful in manipulating the factors that this manipulation intends to manipulate.

## Appendix C

### Additional Analyses about Acquiescence Bias




Figure C1. Effect of SSI by politician ideology using results from Table C1. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Table C1

Study 2 M2 Reestimated Using Only Negatively Keyed Items in SSI, and Racial Resentment as Racism Measure

Models	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% CI
Racism	-0.55***	0.06	[-0.67, -0.43]
Sexism1	0.16	0.10	[-0.03, 0.34]
Sexism2	-0.25**	0.09	[-0.42, -0.07]
D_ideology × Racism	0.92***	0.08	[0.76, 1.09]
D_ideology × Sexism1	0.27*	0.14	[0.00, 0.53]
D_ideology × Sexism2	0.28*	0.12	[0.04, 0.52]
D_ideo	-0.71***	0.07	[-0.85, -0.57]
D_party	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]
D_race	-0.04*	0.02	[-0.08, <.01]
D_gender	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]
Constant	0.91***	0.06	[0.79, 1.02]
Observations	761		
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.22		

Note. CI = confidence interval. Sexism1 refers to benevolent sexism. Sexism2 refers to separate sphere.

†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

**Appendix D**  
**Availability of Measures in Study 3 by Survey Year**

Table D1  
*Availability of Measures in Study 3 by Survey Year*

Year	1972	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
<b>Racism</b>																	
Presidential candidate								x		x			x	x	x	x	x
House candidate							x		x		x		x	x			
<b>Sexism</b>																	
Presidential candidate	x	x		x		x		x		x		x	x	x	x		
House candidate			x	x	x				x		x	x	x	x			

*Note.* The years during which corresponding measures are available are marked with “x.”

*(Appendices continue)*



Appendix F

Study 3 Results Plotted Separately for Democratic and Republican Candidates




Figure F1. Effect of prejudice by prejudice type, politician type, and perceived ideology. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

(Appendices continue)

## Appendix G

### Alternative Model Specifications for All Studies Including Controls

This appendix summarizes results for all models reported in the main text that were reestimated with control variables. It should be noted that all ideology and party identity variables in all models, other than the first one, were coded in such a way that a higher score means more similar to that of the politician evaluated by participants. (The naming of “Table G1” is intentionally skipped to align table names in this appendix with that of the main text.)

Though the term “D\_Religion  $\times$  Prejudice” in the models in Table G10 appear to have a larger effect than their corresponding terms in the models reported in the main text, its effect size partial  $\eta^2 = 1.27\%$  is still much smaller than that of D\_Ideology  $\times$  Prejudice partial  $\eta^2 = 2.11\%$ . Therefore, these results still support the overall thesis that the effect of prejudice is primarily moderated by a politician’s ideology as opposed to a politician’s demographic background.

*(Appendices continue)*

**Table G2**  
*Models in Study 1b (Models in Table 2) Reestimated With Controls*

Models	Obama			Sanders			Clinton			Carson			Trump			Fiorina			
	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	
Racism	-0.43***	0.03	-0.49	-0.37	-0.25***	0.03	-0.32	-0.19	-0.23***	0.03	-0.29	-0.16	0.22***	0.03	0.16	0.29	0.41***	0.04	0.49
Sexism	-0.06†	0.03	-0.12	<.01	-0.14***	0.03	-0.21	-0.07	-0.04	0.03	-0.10	0.03	0.07†	0.03	-0.00	0.13	-0.04	0.04	0.34
Gender	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.04	-0.03†	0.02	-0.12
Age	-0.07*	0.03	-0.14	-0.01	-0.06	0.04	-0.14	0.01	0.07	0.04	-0.00	0.15	0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.09	0.16***	0.04	0.08
Education	-0.04	0.03	-0.09	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.07	0.05	-0.03†	0.03	-0.09	0.03	0.07*	0.03	0.01	0.13	0.02	0.03	-0.04
Income	-0.04	0.04	-0.11	0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.07	0.10	-0.09*	0.04	-0.17	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	-0.11	0.05	-0.01	0.05	-0.10
Republican	-0.48***	0.03	-0.53	-0.43	-0.19***	0.03	-0.25	-0.13	-0.49***	0.03	-0.55	-0.43	0.16***	0.03	0.10	0.22	0.29***	0.03	0.23
Conservative	-0.17***	0.03	-0.24	-0.11	-0.34***	0.04	-0.42	-0.27	-0.18***	0.04	-0.26	-0.11	0.32	0.04	0.24	0.39	0.15***	0.04	0.07
Constant	1.11***	0.03	1.05	1.18	0.97***	0.04	0.90	1.04	0.86***	0.04	0.79	0.93	0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.09	-0.14***	0.04	-0.22
Observations	955				950				956				953				954		937
R <sup>2</sup>	0.66				0.45				0.52				0.37				0.43		0.29

Note. CI = confidence interval. All estimates marked as “0.00” in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.  
†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

**Table G3**  
*Models in Study 1b (Models in Table 3) Reestimated With Controls*

Models	Obama			Sanders			Clinton			Carson			Trump			Fiorina			
	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	97.5% CI	
Racism	-0.26***	0.03	-0.32	-0.19	-0.19***	0.04	-0.26	-0.12	-0.14***	0.04	-0.21	-0.07	-0.03	0.04	-0.11	0.04	-0.03	0.03	-0.09
Sexism	-0.07*	0.03	-0.14	-0.01	-0.15***	0.04	-0.22	-0.08	-0.05	0.04	-0.12	0.02	0.10**	0.04	0.03	0.17	0.06†	0.03	-0.00
Gender	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.02
Age	-0.13***	0.04	-0.20	-0.06	-0.10*	0.04	-0.17	-0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.04	0.12	0.04	0.04	-0.04	0.11	0.04	0.04	-0.03
Education	-0.01	0.03	-0.07	0.04	-0.00	0.03	-0.06	0.06	-0.01	0.03	-0.07	0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.10	0.04	0.03	-0.01
Income	-0.02	0.04	-0.10	0.06	0.03	0.04	-0.06	0.11	-0.08*	0.04	-0.17	0.00	-0.06	0.04	-0.14	0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.09
Republican	-0.57***	0.03	-0.62	-0.51	-0.23***	0.04	-0.29	-0.18	-0.54***	0.03	-0.60	-0.48	0.22***	0.03	0.16	0.28	0.29***	0.03	0.14
Conservative	-0.28***	0.04	-0.35	-0.21	-0.40***	0.04	-0.47	-0.32	-0.23***	0.04	-0.30	-0.16	0.40***	0.04	0.32	0.47	0.27***	0.04	0.20
Constant	1.07***	0.03	1.00	1.13	0.96***	0.04	0.89	1.03	0.84***	0.04	0.77	0.91	0.10**	0.04	0.03	0.17	0.11***	0.03	0.04
Observations	946				943				947				944				929		945
R-squared	0.61				0.43				0.51				0.35				0.26		0.39

Note. CI = confidence interval. All estimates marked as “0.00” in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.  
†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table G4  
*Models in Table 4 Reestimated With Controls*

Models	Ideological model			Demographic model		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
Racism	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.09, -0.04]	-0.09***	0.01	[-0.12, -0.06]
Sexism	-0.05**	0.02	[-0.08, -0.02]	-0.05**	0.02	[-0.09, -0.02]
D_Ideo	-0.19***	0.01	[-0.21, -0.18]			
D_Race				-0.05***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.03]
D_Gender				0.02***	0	[0.01, 0.03]
D_Ideo × Racism	0.29***	0.01	[0.26, 0.31]			
D_Ideo × Sexism	0.05***	0.01	[0.03, 0.08]			
D_Race × Racism				0.07***	0.01	[0.05, 0.09]
D_Gender × Sexism				0.01	0.01	[-0.01, 0.04]
Gender	0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.02]	0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.02]
Age	0.02	0.02	[-0.02, 0.06]	0.02	0.02	[-0.02, 0.06]
Education	0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0.04]	0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0.04]
Income	-0.04	0.02	[-0.08, 0]	-0.04	0.02	[-0.08, 0]
Party identity (1 = similar)	0.30***	0.01	[0.27, 0.32]	0.38***	0.01	[0.36, 0.41]
Ideology (1 = similar)	0.23***	0.02	[0.20, 0.26]	0.34***	0.01	[0.31, 0.37]
Constant	0.22**	0.02	[0.18, 0.25]	0.13***	0.02	[0.09, 0.16]
Observations	5,705			5,705		
Number of groups	956			956		
AIC BIC		626.73 719.82			1052.08 1151.82	

Note. CI = confidence interval; AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.

†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table G5  
*Mixed Models From Study 1b Using Alternative Racism Measure (Models in Table 5) Reestimated With Controls*

Models	Ideological model			Demographic model		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
Racism	-0.09***	0.02	[-0.12, -0.05]	-0.11***	0.02	[-0.15, -0.08]
Sexism	-0.05**	0.02	[-0.09, -0.02]	-0.06**	0.02	[-0.09, -0.02]
D_Ideo	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.06]			
D_Race				-0.03***	0.01	[-0.04, -0.02]
D_Gender				0.02***	0	[0.01, 0.03]
D_Ideo × Racism	0.13***	0.01	[0.10, 0.16]			
D_Ideo × Sexism	0.06***	0.01	[0.03, 0.09]			
D_Race × Racism				0.07***	0.01	[0.04, 0.1]
D_Gender × Sexism				0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0.04]
Gender	-0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.02]	-0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.02]
Age	0.00	0.02	[-0.03, 0.04]	0.00	0.02	[-0.03, 0.04]
Education	0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0.04]	0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0.04]
Income	-0.04	0.02	[-0.08, 0]	-0.04	0.02	[-0.08, 0]
Party identity (1 = similar)	0.36***	0.01	[0.33, 0.38]	0.39***	0.01	[0.36, 0.41]
Ideology (1 = similar)	0.31***	0.02	[0.28, 0.34]	0.34***	0.01	[0.31, 0.37]
Constant	0.15***	0.02	[0.11, 0.18]	0.12***	0.02	[0.09, 0.16]
Observations	5,654			5,654		
Number of groups	947			947		
AIC BIC		1000.00 1092.97			1062.84 1162.44	

Note. CI = confidence interval. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.

†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

**Table G6**  
*Models in Study 2 (Models in Table 6) Using the Racial Resentment Scale as Racism Measure Reestimated With Controls*

Models	M1. Moderator includes all			M2. D_Ideology as moderator			M3. D_Party as moderator			M4. D_Race as moderator			M5. D_Gender as moderator		
	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI	b	SE	95% CI
Female	<.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]	<.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]	<.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]	<.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]	<.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]
Age	-0.20***	0.05	[-0.29, -0.11]	-0.20***	0.05	[-0.29, -0.11]	-0.19***	0.05	[-0.29, -0.09]	-0.20***	0.05	[-0.29, -0.10]	-0.20***	0.05	[-0.29, -0.11]
Income	0.05	0.04	[-0.03, 0.12]	0.04	0.04	[-0.03, 0.12]	0.04	0.04	[-0.04, 0.12]	0.04	0.04	[-0.04, 0.11]	0.04	0.04	[-0.04, 0.12]
Education	0.00	0.05	[-0.10, 0.11]	0.00	0.05	[-0.10, 0.11]	0.02	0.06	[-0.09, 0.13]	0.02	0.06	[-0.09, 0.13]	0.02	0.06	[-0.09, 0.13]
Ideology	0.24***	0.04	[0.16, 0.32]	0.24***	0.04	[0.16, 0.32]	0.41***	0.04	[0.33, 0.48]	0.41***	0.04	[0.34, 0.48]	0.41***	0.04	[0.34, 0.48]
Party identification	0.10***	0.03	[0.04, 0.16]	0.09***	0.03	[0.04, 0.14]	0.10***	0.03	[0.04, 0.16]	0.09***	0.03	[0.04, 0.15]	0.09***	0.03	[0.04, 0.15]
Racism	-0.36***	0.10	[-0.55, -0.17]	-0.43***	0.06	[-0.55, -0.31]	-0.09	0.06	[-0.21, 0.03]	-0.07	0.06	[-0.19, 0.04]	-0.06	0.06	[-0.18, 0.06]
Sexism1	0.24	0.19	[-0.14, 0.61]	0.14	0.12	[-0.10, 0.37]	0.35**	0.13	[0.11, 0.60]	0.22†	0.12	[-0.02, 0.47]	0.23†	0.13	[-0.04, 0.49]
Sexism2	-0.04	0.17	[-0.37, 0.31]	-0.02	0.11	[-0.24, 0.19]	0.10	0.11	[-0.13, 0.32]	0.11	0.12	[-0.12, 0.35]	0.11	0.12	[-0.12, 0.35]
D_ideology × Racism	0.65***	0.09	[0.47, 0.83]	0.65***	0.09	[0.47, 0.83]									
D_ideology × Sexism1	0.12	0.18	[-0.22, 0.47]	0.10	0.17	[-0.24, 0.44]									
D_ideology × Sexism2	0.31†	0.16	[-0.01, 0.62]	0.32*	0.16	[0.01, 0.63]									
D_party × Racism	0.00	0.09	[-0.17, 0.18]												
D_party × Sexism1	-0.21	0.18	[-0.56, 0.13]												
D_party × Sexism2	0.01	0.16	[-0.32, 0.33]												
D_race × Racism	-0.05	0.08	[-0.21, 0.11]												
D_race × Sexism1	0.03	0.17	[-0.31, 0.37]												
D_race × Sexism2	-0.02	0.16	[-0.33, 0.29]												
D_gender × Racism	-0.10	0.08	[-0.27, 0.06]												
D_gender × Sexism1	-0.03	0.17	[-0.37, 0.32]												
D_gender × Sexism2	0.06	0.16	[-0.26, 0.37]												
D_ideo	-0.53***	0.07	[-0.67, -0.39]	-0.53***	0.07	[-0.66, -0.39]									
D_party	0.07	0.07	[-0.07, 0.21]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]									
D_race	-0.01	0.07	[-0.14, 0.12]	-0.03	0.02	[-0.07, 0.01]									
D_gender	0.03	0.07	[-0.10, 0.16]	-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]									
Constant	0.59***	0.10	[0.40, 0.78]	0.67***	0.08	[0.52, 0.81]	0.24**	0.08	[0.09, 0.39]	0.29***	0.07	[0.15, 0.43]	0.28***	0.07	[0.14, 0.42]
Observations	733			733			733			733			733		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29			0.29			0.22			0.21			0.21		

*Note.* CI = confidence interval. Sexism1 refers to ambivalent sexism. Sexism2 refers to separeat sphere ideology. All estimates marked as “0.00” in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.  
†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

**Table G7**  
**Models in Study 2 (Models in Table 7) Using Alternative Racism Measure as Racism Measure Reestimated With Controls**

Models	M1. moderator includes all				M2. D_ Ideology as moderator				M3. D_Party as moderator				M4. D_Race as moderator				M5. D_Gender as moderator				M6. No moderator			
	b	SE	95% CI		b	SE	95% CI		b	SE	95% CI		b	SE	95% CI		b	SE	95% CI		b	SE	95% CI	
Female	0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]		0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]		0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]		0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]		0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]		0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]	
Age	-0.21***	0.05	[-0.31, -0.12]		-0.21***	0.05	[-0.31, -0.12]		-0.20***	0.05	[-0.30, -0.11]		-0.20***	0.05	[-0.30, -0.11]		-0.20***	0.05	[-0.30, -0.11]		-0.20***	0.05	[-0.30, -0.11]	
Education	0.04	0.06	[-0.07, 0.15]		0.03	0.06	[-0.08, 0.14]		0.04	0.06	[-0.07, 0.16]		0.04	0.06	[-0.07, 0.16]		0.04	0.06	[-0.07, 0.16]		0.04	0.06	[-0.07, 0.15]	
Income	0.02	0.04	[-0.06, 0.1]		0.02	0.04	[-0.06, 0.1]		0.02	0.04	[-0.06, 0.09]		0.01	0.04	[-0.07, 0.09]		0.01	0.04	[-0.06, 0.09]		0.01	0.04	[-0.06, 0.09]	
Party identification	0.10***	0.03	[0.04, 0.16]		0.10***	0.03	[0.04, 0.15]		0.09**	0.03	[0.03, 0.15]		0.09**	0.03	[0.04, 0.14]		0.09**	0.03	[0.04, 0.14]		0.09**	0.03	[0.04, 0.14]	
Ideology	0.36***	0.04	[0.28, 0.43]		0.36***	0.04	[0.28, 0.43]		0.41***	0.04	[0.34, 0.48]		0.41***	0.04	[0.34, 0.48]		0.41***	0.04	[0.34, 0.49]		0.41***	0.04	[0.34, 0.49]	
Racism	-0.22*	0.11	[-0.43, -0.01]		-0.33***	0.07	[-0.47, -0.19]		-0.26***	0.07	[-0.40, -0.13]		-0.18**	0.07	[-0.31, -0.05]		-0.16*	0.07	[-0.30, -0.03]		-0.22**	0.05	[-0.32, -0.13]	
Sexism1	0.08	0.20	[-0.31, 0.47]		0.07	0.12	[-0.17, 0.31]		0.28*	0.13	[0.03, 0.53]		0.25*	0.13	[0.01, 0.5]		0.18	0.13	[-0.08, 0.45]		0.22*	0.09	[0.04, 0.4]	
Sexism2	0.02	0.18	[-0.34, 0.37]		-0.03	0.11	[-0.24, 0.19]		0.17	0.11	[-0.05, 0.4]		0.10	0.12	[-0.13, 0.34]		0.19	0.12	[-0.05, 0.42]		0.15†	0.08	[-0.01, 0.32]	
D_Ideology × Racism	0.19*	0.10	[0.00, 0.39]		0.19†	0.10	[-0.00, 0.38]																	
D_Ideology × Sexism1	0.26	0.18	[-0.10, 0.63]		0.25	0.18	[-0.11, 0.61]																	
D_Ideology × Sexism2	0.39*	0.17	[0.06, 0.72]		0.38*	0.16	[0.06, 0.7]																	
D_Party × Racism	0.07	0.10	[-0.12, 0.27]																					
D_Party × Sexism1	-0.05	0.18	[-0.41, 0.31]						0.08	0.10	[-0.11, 0.28]													
D_Party × Sexism2	-0.12	0.17	[-0.46, 0.21]						-0.13	0.18	[-0.49, 0.22]													
D_Race × Racism	-0.14	0.10	[-0.33, 0.05]						-0.03	0.17	[-0.36, 0.3]													
D_Race × Sexism1	-0.07	0.18	[-0.42, 0.29]																					
D_Race × Sexism2	0.11	0.16	[-0.22, 0.43]																					
D_Gender × Racism	-0.15	0.10	[-0.34, 0.03]																					
D_Gender × Sexism1	0.09	0.18	[-0.27, 0.44]																					
D_Gender × Sexism2	-0.08	0.17	[-0.40, 0.25]																					
D_Ideology	-0.35***	0.07	[-0.50, -0.21]		-0.34***	0.07	[-0.49, -0.2]		-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.03]		-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.03]		-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.03]		-0.01	0.02	[-0.05, 0.03]	
D_Party	0.05	0.07	[-0.09, 0.19]		0.00	0.02	[-0.04, 0.04]		0.05	0.07	[-0.10, 0.19]		0.01	0.02	[-0.03, 0.05]		0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]		0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.05]	
D_Race	0.00	0.07	[-0.13, 0.14]		-0.04†	0.02	[-0.08, 0.01]		-0.04†	0.02	[-0.08, 0.01]		-0.01	0.07	[-0.15, 0.13]		-0.03	0.02	[-0.08, 0.01]		-0.04	0.02	[-0.08, 0.01]	
D_Gender	0.03	0.07	[-0.10, 0.17]		-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]		-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]		-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]		0.02	0.07	[-0.12, 0.16]		-0.02	0.02	[-0.06, 0.02]	
Constant	0.45***	0.10	[0.26, 0.65]		0.52***	0.08	[0.37, 0.67]		0.29***	0.1	[0.14, 0.44]		0.29***	0.07	[0.15, 0.44]		0.29***	0.08	[0.14, 0.43]		0.31***	0.07	[0.18, 0.44]	
Observations	702				702				702				702				702				702			
R <sup>2</sup>	0.27				0.26				0.23				0.23				0.23				0.23			

Note. CI = confidence interval. Sexism1 refers to ambivalent sexism. Sexism2 refers to separatist sexism. Ideology refers to ambivalent ideology. All estimates marked as “0.00” in the tables denote values that are between -.01 and .01.  
 †  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

**Table G8**  
*Models in Study 3 (Models in Table 8) Using the Racial Resentment Scale as the Racism Measure Reestimated With Controls*

Models	Racism as prejudice						Sexism as prejudice						
	M5. Presidential candidate			M6. House candidate			M7. Presidential candidate			M8. House candidate			
	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	<i>b</i>	SE	95% CI	
Gender 1 = female	0.01	0	[-0.00, 0.01]	0.03***	0.01	[0.01, 0.04]	0.01***	0	[0.00, 0.02]	0.03***	0	0.02	[0.02, 0.04]
Age	0.07***	0.01	[0.05, 0.08]	0.12***	0.02	[0.08, 0.15]	0.04***	0.01	[0.03, 0.06]	0.11***	0.01	0.09	[0.09, 0.14]
Education	-0.00	0.01	[-0.01, 0.01]	-0.01	0.01	[-0.03, 0.02]	-0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0.01]	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	[-0.03, 0.01]
Income	-0.00	0.01	[-0.01, 0.01]	-0.00	0.01	[-0.03, 0.02]	-0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.01]	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	[-0.02, 0.01]
Party identification (1 = similar)	0.44***	0.01	[0.43, 0.45]	0.18***	0.01	[0.15, 0.21]	0.36***	0.01	[0.35, 0.37]	0.18***	0.01	0.16	[0.16, 0.21]
Ideology (1 = similar)	0.20***	0.01	[0.19, 0.21]	0.12***	0.02	[0.09, 0.15]	0.21***	0.01	[0.19, 0.22]	0.14***	0.01	0.12	[0.12, 0.17]
Candidate party (1 = Rep)	-0.20***	0.02	[-0.23, -0.16]	0.16**	0.05	[0.05, 0.26]	0.18***	0.01	[0.16, 0.21]	0.16***	0.02	0.13	[0.13, 0.21]
Perceived candidate's conservatism	0.00	0.02	[-0.04, 0.04]	-0.09	0.05	[-0.20, 0.02]	0.19***	0.01	[0.16, 0.21]	0.15***	0.02	0.11	[0.11, 0.19]
Prejudice	-0.30***	0.01	[-0.33, -0.28]	-0.30***	0.04	[-0.37, -0.22]	-0.10***	0.01	[-0.12, -0.08]	-0.13***	0.02	-0.18	[-0.18, -0.08]
Candidate Party × Prejudice	0.36***	0.03	[0.31, 0.41]	-0.11	0.08	[-0.26, 0.05]	-0.03	0.02	[-0.08, 0.02]	-0.13***	0.05	-0.23	[-0.23, -0.04]
Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Prejudice	0.36***	0.03	[0.30, 0.43]	0.54***	0.08	[0.37, 0.71]	0.17***	0.03	[0.11, 0.22]	0.26***	0.05	0.16	[0.16, 0.36]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism	-0.09**	0.03	[-0.15, -0.04]	-0.39***	0.08	[-0.55, -0.23]	-0.33***	0.02	[-0.37, -0.31]	-0.35***	0.03	-0.41	[-0.41, -0.29]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Prejudice	-0.19***	0.04	[-0.28, -0.11]	0.20	0.13	[-0.05, 0.46]	0.14***	0.04	[0.06, 0.22]	0.26***	0.08	0.10	[0.10, 0.41]
1976							0.02***	0.01	[0.01, 0.04]	-0.04***	0.01	-0.07	[-0.07, -0.03]
1980							-0.04***	0.01	[-0.05, -0.03]	-0.04***	0.01	-0.06	[-0.06, -0.02]
1982							0.01	0.01	[-0.01, 0.02]	0.01	0.01	-0.01	[-0.01, 0.02]
1984							0.01	0.01	[-0.00, 0.02]	0.01	0.01	-0.01	[-0.01, 0.02]
1988							-0.01	0.01	[-0.03, 0.02]	-0.04***	0.01	-0.06	[-0.06, -0.02]
1990							-0.04***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.02]	-0.05***	0.01	-0.09	[-0.09, -0.05]
1992							-0.03***	0.01	[-0.04, -0.01]	-0.07***	0.01	-0.08	[-0.08, -0.05]
1994							-0.03***	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]	-0.06***	0.01	-0.08	[-0.08, -0.03]
1996							-0.01	0.01	[-0.03, 0.01]	-0.05***	0.01	-0.08	[-0.08, -0.02]
1998							-0.01	0.01	[-0.02, 0.01]	-0.06***	0.01	-0.08	[-0.08, -0.04]
2000							0.23***	0.01	[0.21, 0.24]	0.39***	0.02	0.43	[0.36, 0.43]
2004							19,870			7,100			
2008							10,220			347			
2012													
2016													
Constant	24,428	0.39***	[0.37, 0.41]	3,680	0.51***	[0.45, 0.57]	19,870	0.23***	[0.21, 0.24]	7,100	0.39***	0.43	[0.36, 0.43]
Observations	12,427			316			10,220			347			
Number of groups													

Note. CI = confidence interval. "Prejudice" refers to "racism" in the models that are under "Racism as Prejudice" (i.e., M1, M2, M5, and M6). "Prejudice" refers to "sexism" in the models that are under "Sexism as Prejudice" (i.e., M3, M4, M7, and M8). Baseline year for M1 is 1988, M2 is 1986, M3 is 1972, M4 is 1978, M5 is 1988, M6 is 1986, M7 is 1972, and M8 is 1978. All "0" denotes values that are between -0.01 and 0.1.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

Table G9

*Models in Study 3 (Models in Table 9) Using Alternative Racism Measure as the Racism Measure Reestimated With Controls*

Models	Presidential candidate			House candidate		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
Female	0.00*	0	[0.00, 0.01]	0.02***	0	[0.01, 0.03]
Age	0.06***	0.01	[0.05, 0.07]	0.13***	0.01	[0.11, 0.15]
Education	-0.01†	0	[-0.02, 0]	-0.02**	0.01	[-0.04, -0.01]
Income	0.00	0	[-0.01, 0.01]	-0.01	0.01	[-0.03, 0.01]
Party identification	0.42***	0	[0.41, 0.43]	0.18***	0.01	[0.17, 0.19]
Ideology	0.26***	0.01	[0.25, 0.28]	0.16***	0.01	[0.13, 0.18]
Candidate party (1 = Rep)	0.01	0.01	[-0.01, 0.03]	0.16***	0.02	[0.11, 0.21]
Perceived candidate's conservatism	0.21***	0.01	[0.19, 0.24]	0.13***	0.03	[0.08, 0.18]
Racism	-0.20***	0.01	[-0.23, -0.18]	-0.23***	0.03	[-0.29, -0.17]
Candidate Party × Racism	0.23***	0.03	[0.18, 0.28]	-0.13*	0.06	[-0.25, -0.01]
Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Racism	0.04	0.03	[-0.02, 0.1]	0.24***	0.06	[0.12, 0.37]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism	-0.25***	0.02	[-0.28, -0.21]	-0.33***	0.04	[-0.41, -0.26]
Candidate Party × Perceived Candidate's Conservatism × Racism	-0.03	0.04	[-0.11, 0.06]	0.15	0.1	[-0.04, 0.35]
1976	0.03***	0.01	[0.01, 0.04]			
1980	-0.04***	0.01	[-0.05, -0.02]			
1982				0.00	0.01	[-0.02, 0.02]
1984	0.00	0.01	[-0.01, 0.01]			
1986				0.01	0.01	[-0.01, 0.03]
1988	0.01	0.01	[-0.01, 0.02]			
1990				-0.01	0.01	[-0.03, 0.01]
1992	-0.05***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.04]			
1994				-0.03**	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]
1996	-0.03***	0.01	[-0.04, -0.02]	-0.02*	0.01	[-0.05, 0]
1998				-0.02†	0.01	[-0.04, 0]
2000	-0.03**	0.01	[-0.04, -0.01]	-0.02	0.01	[-0.04, 0.01]
2004	-0.05***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.03]	-0.03**	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]
2008	-0.02**	0.01	[-0.03, -0.01]			
2012	-0.07***	0	[-0.08, -0.06]			
2016	-0.19***	0.01	[-0.20, -0.18]			
Constant	0.23***	0.01	[0.22, 0.25]	0.41***	0.02	[0.37, 0.44]
Observations	35,145			7,871		
Number of groups	17,930			382		

Note. CI = confidence interval. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between  $-.01$  and  $.01$ .

†  $p < .10$ . \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table G10

*Models in Study 4 (Models in Table 10) Reestimated With Controls*

Models	M1. Moderator include both			M2. D_Ideology as moderator			M3. D_Race as moderator		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
Female	0.04*	0.02	[0.00, 0.07]	0.03*	0.02	[0.00, 0.07]	0.04*	0.02	[0.00, 0.07]
Age	-0.01	0.04	[-0.08, 0.06]	-0.01	0.04	[-0.09, 0.06]	-0.02	0.04	[-0.09, 0.06]
Income	-0.02	0.03	[-0.07, 0.03]	-0.02	0.03	[-0.07, 0.03]	-0.02	0.03	[-0.07, 0.03]
Ideology	0.32***	0.04	[0.24, 0.4]	0.32***	0.04	[0.24, 0.4]	0.38***	0.04	[0.30, 0.46]
Party identification	0.46***	0.05	[0.37, 0.56]	0.46***	0.05	[0.36, 0.55]	0.47***	0.05	[0.38, 0.57]
Racism	-0.27***	0.07	[-0.41, -0.14]	-0.18**	0.06	[-0.29, -0.06]	-0.04	0.05	[-0.15, 0.06]
D_Race	-0.11***	0.03	[-0.17, -0.05]	-0.04*	0.02	[-0.07, -0.01]	-0.11***	0.03	[-0.17, -0.05]
D_Ideology	-0.24***	0.04	[-0.31, -0.17]	-0.24***	0.04	[-0.31, -0.17]	-0.07***	0.02	[-0.10, -0.04]
D_Race × Racism	0.19*	0.07	[0.05, 0.34]				0.19*	0.08	[0.04, 0.33]
D_Ideo × Racism	0.43***	0.08	[0.27, 0.59]	0.43***	0.08	[0.27, 0.59]			
Constant	0.31***	0.04	[0.22, 0.39]	0.27***	0.04	[0.19, 0.35]	0.18***	0.04	[0.11, 0.26]
Observations	870			870			870		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.53			0.52			0.51		

Note. CI = confidence interval.

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

(Appendices continue)

Table G11  
*Models in Study 5 (Models in Table 11) Reestimated With Controls*

Models	M1. Moderator include both			M2. D_Ideology as moderator			M3. D_Religion as moderator		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
Gender 1 = female	-0.00	0.02	[-0.04, 0.03]	-0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.03]	-0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.03]
Age	-0.04	0.04	[-0.12, 0.04]	-0.04	0.04	[-0.12, 0.04]	-0.05	0.04	[-0.13, 0.03]
Income	0.01	0.03	[-0.04, 0.07]	0.02	0.03	[-0.04, 0.07]	0.01	0.03	[-0.05, 0.06]
Ideology (1 = similar)	0.41***	0.05	[0.32, 0.5]	0.41***	0.05	[0.32, 0.5]	0.43***	0.05	[0.34, 0.53]
Party identification (1 = similar)	0.22***	0.05	[0.12, 0.32]	0.22***	0.05	[0.12, 0.32]	0.25***	0.05	[0.15, 0.35]
Prejudice (against Muslim)	-0.35***	0.05	[-0.45, -0.26]	-0.25***	0.04	[-0.33, -0.17]	-0.22***	0.04	[-0.30, -0.14]
D_Religion	-0.10***	0.03	[-0.15, -0.04]	-0.01	0.02	[-0.04, 0.02]	-0.10***	0.03	[-0.16, -0.04]
D_Ideology	-0.23***	0.03	[-0.29, -0.17]	-0.23***	0.03	[-0.30, -0.17]	-0.11***	0.02	[-0.14, -0.07]
D_Religion × Prejudice	0.20***	0.06	[0.09, 0.31]				0.21***	0.06	[0.10, 0.32]
D_Ideology × Prejudice	0.27***	0.06	[0.16, 0.39]	0.28***	0.06	[0.16, 0.4]			
Constant	0.44***	0.04	[0.36, 0.52]	0.40***	0.04	[0.32, 0.47]	0.36***	0.04	[0.29, 0.43]
Observations	990			990	0.43		990		
R <sup>2</sup>	0.44			0.43			0.42		

Note. CI = confidence interval. All estimates marked as "0.00" in the tables denote values that are between  $-.01$  and  $.01$ .

\*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

## Appendix H

### Hypothesis 2: Assumptions About the Main Effect of Demographic Background

Though the demographically prejudicial perspective, or Hypothesis 2, focuses on an interactive effect between participants' prejudice and politicians' demographic background, this interactive effect has an assumption that there is a main effect of demographic background. In particular, in the perspective of Hypothesis 2, people at the lowest level of, for instance, racism against Black people would evaluate a White candidate exactly the same as a Black candidate. For people who are at a higher level of racism, there would be a spread of their evaluation for the candidates, and this spread is larger as we move toward people whose level of racism gets higher. As a result, the average evaluation for a Black politician would necessarily be less than that of a White politician. The same is true for a female politician versus a male politician, and so on. Therefore, it is the Hypothesis 2's assumption about the

main effect of demographic background that these results have a case against.

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the necessity of this assumption has its own assumption, which is that people at the lowest level of, for instance, racism would evaluate White candidates and Black candidates exactly the same. However, it is possible that there are people who are prejudiced against White candidates relative to Black candidates, and the above-mentioned assumption would not be able to accommodate this scenario.

Received November 19, 2019

Revision received May 12, 2020

Accepted May 25, 2020 ■